Port security
[7] Other measures include physical security barriers, such as CCTV cameras and adequate light at the port in order to ensure that cargo theft does not take place.
[9] These efforts have been criticised as the use of quantitative and statistical approach to security in the maritime supply chain is argued to overlook low probability, high impact events.
[19] Former U.S. Coast Guard officer Stephen Flynn has stated that interest in shipping container security has seen a definitive shift pre and post-9/11.
[22] Additionally, the U.S. government showed an interest in funding and developing homeland security, which has been critiqued by maritime experts as merely ‘constructing barricades to fend off terrorists’.
[23] Every year, the United States Marine Transportation System moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and international goods.
[22] In 2001, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 was submitted to the House of Representatives, and subsequently referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
The initiative is a voluntary partnership between principal stakeholders in the public and private sector (importers, shipping container carriers, customs brokers and manufacturers).
Specifically focusing on containerised cargo entering U.S. ports, the bilateral information sharing initiative was intended to ‘extend the zone of security outward so that American borders are the last line of defence, not the first’.
The reciprocal system between U.S. and foreign ports, makes it possible for U.S. bound shipping containers to be inspected at their host port, instead of upon arrival in the U.S.[33] The 2002 RAND SeaCurity conference revealed that the European Commission ‘strongly opposes’ the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and particularly the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT).
[35] However, neither the UNODC's annual reports, nor their Maritime Crime Manual for Criminal Justice Practitioners, make any mention of shipping container surveillance.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) is an amendment of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), which entered into force in July 2004.
[36] Maritime security expert Peter Chalk acknowledges that government initiatives up until 2008 have ‘conferred a degree of transparency' by laying the parameters - the 'rules, principles, and attendant responsibilities for international cooperation', providing a ‘common framework in which to further develop’.
Criticising the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code as a failure, since it includes countries who lack resources to properly comply and audit.
[20] Collaborative efforts between the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Bureau of Consular Affairs and the U.S. Department of State have been attempted through a Memorandum of Agreement.
Ronald O’Rourke, a specialist in U.S. naval affairs, who details the Coast Guard's self assessment for the fiscal year of 2006 and their subsequent trialing of Marine Domain Awareness (MDA) and Automated Identification Systems (AIS) nationwide.
[40] Admiral James Loy and Captain Robert Ross suggest a multilateral approach with U.S. trading partners (public and private) be pursued.
[42] Former U.S. Coast Guard Commander Stephen Flynn also suggests extending current initiatives to include bilateral and multilateral international inspection zones.
The United States and global economies depend on commercial shipping as the most reliable, cost efficient method of transporting goods, with U.S. ports handling approximately 20% of the maritime trade worldwide.
An attack on any aspect of the maritime system, mainly major ports, can severely hamper trade and potentially affect the global economy by billions of dollars.
Potential threats include the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a radiological "dirty" bomb, a conventional explosive device, and transportation of terrorist operatives, as well.
Studies have claimed a Hiroshima sized nuclear detonation at a major seaport would kill fifty thousand to one million people.
[46] It is common knowledge within the industry that security measures of major ports cannot have a significant effect on the movement of goods, thereby allowing exploitation of the system for terrorist use.
[47] When the International Longshore and Warehouse Union strike closed 29 West Coast ports for 10 days, one study estimated that it cost the United States economy $19.4 billion.
[48] Many manufacturing companies of the world employ a just-in-time distribution model, allowing for lower inventory carrying costs and savings from warehouse space.
[47] Although this method has dropped costs significantly, it has put a stranglehold on security options, as the shipping times of these shipments are exact and cannot afford delays from inspection.
The consolidation may offer some long-term benefits, but three challenges may hinder a successful implementation of security enhancing initiatives at the nations ports: standards, funding, and collaboration.
The second challenge involves determining the amounts needed and sources of funding for the kinds of security improvements that are likely to be required to meet the standards.
Florida's experience indicates that security measures are likely to be more expensive than many anticipate, and determining how to pay these costs and how the federal government should participate will present a challenge.
Experience to date indicates that this coordination is more difficult than many stakeholders anticipate, and that continued practice and testing will be key in making it work.
Whilst the threat of terrorism cannot be totally be dismissed the day-to-day operations of port and harbour police more often deals with more mundane issues, such as theft (including pilferage by dock workers), smuggling, illegal immigration; health and safety with regards to hazardous cargoes, safe docking of vessels, and safe operation of vehicles and plant; environmental protection e.g. spillages and contaminated bilge water.
