Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd

Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415 is a leading UK company law decision of the UK Supreme Court concerning the nature of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, resulting trusts and equitable proprietary remedies in the context of English family law.

Mrs Prest said they held legal title to properties that he beneficially owned, including a £4m house at 16 Warwick Avenue, London.

[3] Moylan J, in the Family Division of the High Court, held that Mr Prest had the ability to transfer the properties in practice, so he was “entitled” to them under MCA 1973 s 24(1)(a).

He ordered Mr Prest to transfer to the wife six properties and an interest in a seventh which were held in the name of two of the husband’s companies.

The corporate form needed to be used for an improper purpose, or it had to be shown that the companies held the properties on trust for Mr Prest.

[...] They have led judges of the Family Division to adopt and develop an approach to company owned assets in ancillary relief applications which amounts almost to a separate system of legal rules unaffected by the relevant principles of English property and company law.

Once the marriage broke down, the husband resorted to an array of strategies, of varying degrees of ingenuity and dishonesty, in order to deprive his wife of her accustomed affluence.

If the law permits him so to do it defeats the Family Division judge's overriding duty to achieve a fair result.The Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Court of Appeal and held that Mr Prest beneficially owned the assets of the Petrodel Resources Ltd companies under a resulting trust because he contributed to their purchase price.

He said there was only a limited power to pierce the corporate veil, namely when people were under an existing legal obligation which is deliberately evaded.

There had been no evidence that Mr Prest had set up the companies to avoid any obligations in these divorce proceedings, so there was no ground for piercing the corporate veil.

So, MCA 1973 section 24 did not give judges power to order Mr Prest to transfer property that he was not entitled to in law.

There is a range of situations in which the law attributes the acts or property of a company to those who control it, without disregarding its separate legal personality.

In civil law jurisdictions, the juridical basis of the exceptions is generally the concept of abuse of rights, to which the International Court of Justice was referring in In re Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd[14] when it derived from municipal law a limited principle permitting the piercing of the corporate veil in cases of misuse, fraud, malfeasance or evasion of legal obligations.

One of these principles is that the law defines the incidents of most legal relationships between persons (natural or artificial) on the fundamental assumption that their dealings are honest.

The principle was stated in its most absolute form by Denning LJ in a famous dictum in Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley:[15] "No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud.

The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever…"The principle is mainly familiar in the context of contracts and other consensual arrangements, in which the effect of fraud is to vitiate consent so that the transaction becomes voidable ab initio.

I conclude that there is a limited principle of English law which applies when a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control.

The principle is properly described as a limited one, because in almost every case where the test is satisfied, the facts will in practice disclose a legal relationship between the company and its controller which will make it unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil.

It is not possible to give general guidance going beyond the ordinary principles and presumptions of equity, especially those relating to gifts and resulting trusts.

But I venture to suggest, however tentatively, that in the case of the matrimonial home, the facts are quite likely to justify the inference that the property was held on trust for a spouse who owned and controlled the company.

"[22] In South Africa, "[t]he law is far from settled with regard to the circumstances in which it would be permissible to pierce the corporate veil".

In so far as it is based on "fraud unravels everything", as discussed by Lord Sumption in para 18, the formulation simply involves the invocation of a well-established principle, which exists independently of the doctrine.

They may simply be examples of the principle that the individuals who operate limited companies should not be allowed to take unconscionable advantage of the people with whom they do business.

He agreed that Munby J in Ben Hashem v Al Shayif[25] was correct that the veil could only be pierced where all other possibilities were exhausted.

Also as he said in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp[26] it is wrong to foreclose all future possibilities of piercing the veil.

It is simply a label... to describe the disparate occasions on which some rule of law produces apparent exceptions to the principle of the separate juristic personality of a body corporate...