Proliferation Security Initiative
Despite the support of over half of the Members of the United Nations, a number of countries have expressed opposition to the initiative, including India, China and Indonesia.
[3] The idea of the PSI is generally credited to John R. Bolton, former US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, after 15 Scud missiles found on board an unflagged North Korean freighter, the So Sen, heading towards Yemen had to be released when it turned out that international law did not allow them to be confiscated.
[5][6] Initially, the PSI included 11 "core" states (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the US and Poland).
The document defines the activities which are to be undertaken by the initiative, specifically "to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council circumstances in which such operations may be carried out (at sea, on land, or in the air) including, most importantly, the requirement that any action taken must be consistent with international law.
The Eleven are the Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Panama and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
[9][10] In April 2009, at a speech in Prague, Czech Republic, newly inaugurated President Barack Obama announced that he planned to transform the PSI into a "durable international institution",[11] indicating that US promotion of the initiative would remain non-partisan and cross over from the previous administration.
[13] Current members include:[2][1] Endorsing states are developing a formal set of tools called Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) for use by all PSI partners to aid in their ability to interdict WMD.
Rapid Decision Making – The development of decision-making practices that facilitate timely government responses to interdiction scenarios Examples of these capacity building tools include: • Model Legislation • Commodity identification guides and associated training • Legal analyses of UN Security Council Resolutions • Expert briefings on inspection methodologies • Best practices associated with information sharing and decision-making procedures The CCP effort is advanced by the CCP Review Team, launched in 2015.
Exercises can include "live action" events such as ship boardings or container searches, or be limited to "tabletop" activities where subject matter experts explore legal and operational interdiction questions related to a fictional scenario.
[24] It has also been argued the PSI's intent to "interdict nuclear materials and contraband" is a broad enough charter to include any naval operation anywhere and for any actual purpose.
Domestically in the United States, liberal critics referenced the PSI and its links to Under-Secretary Bolton as an extension of the Bush Administration's "Coalition of the willing.
It has been argued that "the secretiveness surrounding PSI interdictions and the methods employed make it difficult to evaluate its effectiveness or its legitimacy,"[30] and that the lack of formality and structure in the initiative are causes for concern.
"[40] However, references such as these provide no actual information on or evidence of interdictions which have occurred, leaving critics to remain skeptical of such numbers or of any "metrics" that prove the effectiveness of the initiative.
[citation needed] While these criticisms persist, many PSI events, such as annual Operational Experts Group meetings, contain a very high degree of civil society participation.
