Cora Hoexter believes that "the Constitution and, to a lesser extent, the PAJA have brought about a good deal of the reform Baxter hoped for.
"[4] The Constitution offers a multitude of checks on the use of public power at every level, and the administrative system today is replete with safeguards against secrecy, arbitrariness and maladministration.
"[4] On the other hand, "there is no room for complacency—particularly given the growing menace of public corruption, which is rightly regarded as the greatest challenge currently confronting South Africa.
In Glenister v President, the court noted that corruption blatantly undermines the democratic ethos, the institutions of democracy, the rule of law and the foundational values of South Africa's nascent constitutional project, fuelling maladministration and public fraudulence and imperilling the capacity of the state to fulfil its obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil all the rights in the Bill of Rights.
"[5] Where the Law Commission’s draft Bill created an Administrative Review Council (ARC) and placed it under a duty to make recommendations for reform on certain subjects within two or three years, the PAJA merely gives the Minister discretion to make regulations establishing an advisory council which may advise her on certain reforms.
Reform is urgently needed in this area if the system is ever to function as a worthy adjunct and alternative to judicial review.
Earlier versions of the Bill went even further than this in providing for the establishment of a Central Drafting Office, a proposal made in 1993 by O’Regan.
Earlier versions of the Bill were "even more ambitious,"[6] in that they provided for the automatic lapsing of rules and standards within certain periods in terms of "sunset" provisions.
"[6] It is "encouraging," writes Hoexter,[6] that the scrutiny and control of delegated legislation are still being investigated by Parliament as well as by the Law Commission, "but frustrating that some of the interim recommendations made by Parliament’s Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation are almost identical to recommendations made by the Law Commission and rejected by the Portfolio Committee on Justice more than a decade ago.
"[7] A code was produced recently in accordance with section 10(5A) and (6) of the PAJA, and has been accessible as a draft document for some time, but is not yet in force.
Wessels recalls that the workshops revealed some quite alarming ignorance, such as the fact that many administrators had never set eyes on the empowering legislation in terms of which they were making decisions.
"Anecdotes like this one," writes Hoexter, "indicate the importance of sustaining and expanding educational initiatives, several of which are currently being implemented under the auspices of the Department of Justice.