In philosophy, propositional attitudes can be considered to be neurally-realized causally efficacious content-bearing internal states (personal principles/values).
[1] Other comparisons of multiple modalities that frequently arise are the relationships between belief and knowledge and the discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions.
Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as surprises, phenomena that call for explanations to reduce the shock of amazement.
In logic, the formal properties of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others that involve attitudes or intentions toward propositions are notorious for their recalcitrance to analysis.
[A] Bertrand Russell introduced the idea of handling propositions like this:[3] What sort of name shall we give to verbs like 'believe' and 'wish' and so forth?