[10] One day into the crisis, the Saudi-led coalition was joined by Jordan, and were further supported thereafter by the Maldives, Mauritania, Senegal, Djibouti, the Comoros, and the Tobruk-based government in Libya in severing relations with Qatar and closing the country's land routes for its food imports.

[4] According to Oxford tutor Samuel Ramani in an article published in Foreign Policy, the crisis was a failure for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, because Qatar generated closer ties to Iran and Turkey, and became economically and militarily stronger and more autonomous.

[20] Qatar had differences with other Arab governments on a number of issues: it broadcast Al Jazeera; it was accused of maintaining good relations with Iran; and it had supported the Muslim Brotherhood in the past.

The crisis affected the GCC negatively at first – raising questions among member states, revealing shifts in their political agendas, and changing the balance of power in the region to some extent.

Trump gave strong support for Saudi Arabia's efforts in fighting against states and groups allied with Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to an arms deal between the countries.

[27] The Saudi-led move was at once an opportunity for the GCC partners and Egypt to punish their adversaries in Doha, to please their allies in Washington, and to remove attention from their own shortcomings and challenges.

The emails were seen by the Huffington Post as an attempt "to embarrass" Al Otaiba because they showed links between the UAE and the US-based pro-Israel Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

[60][61][62] The semi-autonomous Somali regions of Puntland, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug each issued statements cutting ties with Qatar, in opposition to the neutral stance of the federal government of Somalia.

[73] On 5 July, foreign ministers from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain met in Cairo after receiving a response from Qatar to their list of demands.

The meeting, intended to resolve the dispute, ended in a stalemate when Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir said that the political and economic boycott of Qatar would remain until it changed its policies.

[74] Also on the same day, the Saudi-led bloc withdrew its insistence on compliance with the 13 specific demands of the previous month, instead asking Qatar to accept six broad principles, which included commitments to combat terrorism and extremism and to end acts of provocation and incitement.

[88] On 8 June, President Donald Trump, during a phone call with the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, offered to act as a mediator in the conflict with a White House meeting between the parties if necessary.

[94][95] According to The Intercept, Saudi Arabia and the UAE lobbied Trump to fire Rex Tillerson because he "intervened to stop a secret Saudi-led, UAE-backed plan to invade and essentially conquer Qatar.

[136] On 8 June 2017, Egypt's deputy UN Ambassador Ihab Moustafa called for the United Nations Security Council to launch an investigation into accusations that Qatar "paid up to $1 billion to a terrorist group active in Iraq" to free 26 Qatari hostages, including members of its royal family, which payment would violate UN resolutions.

[137][138] In June 2017, the government of Qatar hired American attorney and politician John Ashcroft to lobby on its behalf and help the state deny international allegations of supporting terror.

[143][144] Israel has not shared a direct diplomatic relation with Qatar since 2012, yet over the past few years, the country has emerged as an unlikely peacemaker in the Middle East by extending a helping hand to Doha and strengthening its ties with its nemesis, UAE.

Israel offered Doha to work along with it on Gaza's reconstruction in June 2020, changing Washington's narrative towards Qatar concerning its relation with Hamas as one focused on getting all parties to cooperate in support of the peace plan initiated by the Trump administration.

In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Qatar in 2019 imposed one round of sanctions against individuals and entities affiliated with the Iranian regime's terror-support networks in the region.

[168] In December 2020, Qatar's ambassador to the United Nations sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the Security Council members, reporting airspace offenses by four Bahraini fighter jets.

[196] In August 2018, Brookfield Property Partners, 9% of which is owned by the Qatar Investment Authority, signed a 99-year lease on Jared Kushner's financially troubled 666 Fifth Avenue skyscraper.

[197][198][199] Despite the ongoing diplomatic blockade led by Saudi Arabia, international banks like HSBC, Goldman Sachs and others sought to repair their ties with Qatar by building stronger financial and business relations.

[200] On 20 January 2019, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani attended the opening session of the Arab Economic Summit in Beirut, Lebanon.

Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani and Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz were the only two Arab leaders to attend the summit.

Despite the severing of ties, Qatari natural gas continued to flow to the UAE and Oman through Abu Dhabi based Dolphin Energy's pipeline.

[206] In March 2019, Qatar lodged a complaint to International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the United Arab Emirates Barakah nuclear power plant, stating that it poses a serious threat to regional stability and the environment.

In a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the United States expressed its readiness to deter and quell any external threat to Qatar's territorial integrity.

In May 2018, the French daily newspaper Le Monde reported that King Salman of Saudi Arabia would take military action if Qatar installed the Russian air defence system.

[237] Hassan Al Thawadi, general secretary of Qatar's FIFA World Cup organizing committee, denied these claims and stated that the various logistical issues arising from the crisis were being resolved.

On the other hand, UAE's ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, was quoted as stating that ending the dispute was not a priority, referring to the ongoing differences with the blockaded nation.

[246] One Middle East policy analyst believed that the secret pact among the Gulf leaders is likely to have been multi-level, which includes several bilateral agreements between individual states rather than a unitary document.