Evan Clarke tried to claim the reward of £1000 for giving information that led to the conviction of a murderer, Treffene, of two policemen called Walsh and Pitman, under the Crown Suits Act 1898.

Evan Clarke proceeded, by petition of right under the Crown Suits Act 1898,[2] to sue the Crown for £1,000 promised by proclamation for such information as should lead to the arrest and conviction of the person or persons who committed the murders of two police officers, Walsh and Pitman.

In the Supreme Court of Western Australia, the Trial Judge, McMillan CJ dismissed the claim, holding that Clarke did not rely upon the offer nor did he intend to enter into a contract, stating Clarke "never was and never intended to be an informer.

[3] The High Court held that Clarke could not claim the reward because it was necessary to act in "reliance on" an offer in order to accept it, and therefore create a contract.

Higgins J interpreted the evidence to say that Clarke had forgotten about the offer of the reward..... Isaacs ACJ said the following.

The information for which Clarke claims the reward was given by him when he was under arrest with Treffene on a charge of murder, and was given by him in circumstances which show that in giving the information he was not acting on or in pursuance of or in reliance upon or in return for the consideration contained in the proclamation, but exclusively in order to clear himself from a false charge of murder.

It is true that without his information and evidence no conviction was probable, but it is also abundantly clear that he was not acting for the sake of justice or from any impulse of conscience or because he was asked to do so, but simply and solely on his own initiative, to secure his own safety from the hand of the law and altogether irrespective of the proclamation.

He, doubtless, finally drew the inference that, having knowledge of the request in the handbill, the plaintiff at last determined to accede, and did accede, to that request, and so acted in response to it, although moved thereto by the incentive supplied by her stings of conscience.

Motive, though not to be confused with intention, is very often strong evidence of that state of mind, both in civil and criminal matters.

If it goes so far as is contended for by the respondent, I am of opinion that it is opposed to unimpeachable authority, and I agree with the suggestion of Sir Frederick Pollock, in the preface to vol.

Lord Kinnear in Jackson v Broatch said: "It is an excellent definition of a contract that it is an agreement which produces an obligation."

The important matter, however, is that the Court, in nonsuiting the plaintiff, said: "We are therefore of opinion, that the offer of the City had ceased before the plaintiffs accepted and acted upon it as such, and that consequently no contract existed upon which this action, founded on an alleged express promise, can be maintained."

The reasoning quoted seems to me to be as exact and as modern as that in Carlill's Case, and to be hardly capable of advantageous alteration.Higgins J agreed and said the following.

I think that there was no contract.... One of the murderers, Treffene, was arrested on 6th June, with Clarke; the other, Coulter, was arrested on 10th June; both were indicted in August and convicted in September of the murder of Walsh; there was an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which failed; and, after the failure of the appeal, Clarke, on the suggestion of Inspector Condon, for the first time thought of the reward and decided to claim it.

On 6th June, Clarke gave false information in order to screen the murderers; and, as he says, "I had no intention then of doing anything to earn the reward.

[...] It should be noted in this connection that the great judgment of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co is addressed to the other condition of contract, that acceptance must be communicated; but the whole judgment assumes that consensus of mind pre-existed—"simple acceptance in your own mind, without any intimation to the other party, and expressed by a mere private act, such as putting a letter into a drawer," does not complete a contract (and see per Lord Cairns LC).

Clarke had seen the offer, indeed; but it was not present to his mind—he had forgotten it, and gave no consideration to it, in his intense excitement as to his own danger.

My view is that Clarke did not act on the faith of, in reliance upon, the proclamation; and that although the exact fulfilment of the conditions stated in the proclamation would raise a presumption that Clarke was acting on the faith of, in reliance upon, the proclamation, that presumption is rebutted by his own express admission....Starke J said "the performance of some of the conditions required by the offer also establishes prima facie an acceptance of the offer.