63, is a Supreme Court of Canada decision on the availability of the defence of intoxication for "general intent" criminal offences.

The Leary rule which eliminated the defence was found unconstitutional in violation of both section 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

An expert witness in pharmacology testified to the likelihood of the defence, and that having drunk as much as he did there was little chance he could have functioned normally or been aware of his actions.

Based on the testimony of the pharmacologist, the trial judge found that Daviault was unable to form a general intent to commit the crime and therefore could be acquitted.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "a state of drunkenness which is so extreme that an accused is in a condition that closely resembles automatism or a disease of the mind as defined in s. 16 of the Criminal Code constitute a basis for defending a crime which requires not a specific but only a general intent?"

Section 11(d) provides the right to be presumed innocent which requires the Crown to prove all elements of an offence.

Basically, the issue was that such offenders may not actually have the blameworthy intent for a legal finding of guilt and may, therefore, be punished based on intoxication, rather than for commission of a crime.

Parliament under the first Chretien government reacted swiftly in response to the ruling, and within months passed Bill C-72 to amend the Criminal Code (1995, c. 32) in section 33.1 under the heading of Self-induced Intoxication.

The preamble forms a severe denunciation of the impugned practice and an endorsement of the most vulnerable members of society.

(3) This section applies in respect of an offence under this Act or any other Act of Parliament that includes as an element an assault or any other interference or threat of interference by a person with the bodily integrity of another person The Supreme Court would strike down section 33.1 in R v Brown.