After the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Fleet Air Arm aircraft flew from the aircraft carriers HMS Victorious and Furious to attack merchant vessels in the northern Norwegian port of Kirkenes and the north Finnish port of Liinakhamari in Petsamo.

The War Cabinet and Admiralty pressed Admiral John "Jack" Tovey, commander of the Home Fleet, to attack, despite his reservations that the prospects for success were not commensurate with the risks.

The Admiralty pressed Admiral John "Jack" Tovey to use the aircraft carriers HMS Furious and Victorious in operations against Axis shipping off northern Norway and Finland.

Tovey stressed the risk in operating carriers so close to Luftwaffe airfields, in conditions of the midnight sun, which in northern Norway lasts from about 14 May to 29 July; Tovey suggested offensive operations further south, stressing the vulnerability of Swordfish and Albacore bombers, even with Fulmar fighter escorts.

The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, insisted that the new alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union needed practical expression in the far north.

[6] The German submarines U-81 and U-652 began operations off the Kola Inlet in July and five destroyers transferred to Kirkenes to join the training ship Bremse and other vessels.

[12] The destroyer Achates struck a British mine off Iceland on 25 July, losing its bow and was towed home by Anthony, the two being replaced by HMS Inglefield and Icarus.

[13] During the night of 26/27 July Force P made course for its rendezvous, about 80 nmi (150 km; 92 mi) north-east of Kirkenes and arrived three days later, having sailed through fog and low cloud, which curtailed flying but helped to conceal its presence.

At 1:30 p.m. on 30 July, once within range of land-based aircraft and dependent on their fighter cover and anti-aircraft guns, the cloudy weather gave way to clear skies.

[14] Little opposition from the Luftwaffe was expected, despite the intensity of German ground operations in the direction of Murmansk and the Fulmars were thought to be adequate air cover during the attack.

[19] The aircraft from Victorious flew towards the sun at low altitude to evade radar but passed over a German hospital ship, losing any remaining hope of surprise.

A Fulmar was lost due to engine failure prior to the attack and the remainder found a harbour almost deserted, except for anti-aircraft guns.

[21] The commander of Furious called the raid ...a bitter blow to the attacking force, who were tee-ed up for really big things, to find they had come over two thousand miles to attack a place without a single real military objective.In 2005, Ron Mackay called the raid an "unqualified disaster"; twelve Albacores and four Fulmars had been lost with 36 casualties.

The vulnerability of the Albacore and Fulmar aircraft against modern fighters had been demonstrated but the Swordfish of 812 NAS had escaped loss, perhaps because the raid on Petsamo had encountered less opposition than that on Kirkenes.

[25] In 2005, Ron Mackay wrote that nine Fleet Air Arm aircrew were killed, 27 taken prisoner and two men were rescued by Soviet forces after two days at sea in a dinghy.

Two Blohm & Voss BV 138 flying-boats began to shadow the force and the FAA Fulmars found it impossible to penetrate their armour with .303 Browning machine-gun fire.