Ralph Waldo Christie (30 August 1893 – 19 December 1987) was an admiral in the United States Navy who played a pivotal role in the development of torpedo technologies.

A 1915 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, Christie served on a variety of warships beginning with the battleship New Jersey in 1915.

In 1923 Christie graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a Master's degree in Mechanical Engineering, specializing in torpedoes.

After the United States entered World War II, Christie was posted to Brisbane and commanded submarine operations during the Solomon Islands campaign.

He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1915 and served on a variety of warships beginning with the battleship New Jersey.

[2] In 1922, as Christie was completing his graduate studies, the Bureau of Ordnance initiated project G-53, a highly secret program to develop a magnetic influence exploder for torpedoes.

[4] Christie urged the Navy Department to allocate a target ship for extensive field tests of the torpedo and exploder.

[5] The Chief of Naval Operations authorized the use of the obsolete destroyer USS Ericsson, but placed so many restrictions on its use, Newport was forced to decline the offer.

Christie's design had the experimental torpedo propel a 500 lb (230 kg) warhead at 50 kn (93 km/h; 58 mph) to a maximum range of 15,000 yd (14,000 m).

[9] Admiral Ernest King favored focusing research efforts on electric torpedoes so work on the oxygen system was downgraded.

As part of secret agreements with Britain, the United States agreed to provide the former with submarines under Royal Navy control, should America enter the conflict.

Christie wanted the new Tambor-class submarines to be assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, but was overruled by Admiral Harold R. Stark, who selected the older S and Barracuda classes instead.

[13] At the outbreak of the Pacific War, remnants of the United States Asiatic Fleet fled to Australia, on orders from Washington.

Despite these reports, Christie was not fully aware of the impact of the situation, because his S-boats used the older Mark 10 torpedo, with a contact-only pistol.

Christie acknowledged Mark 14s were running deeper than set, but attributed the failures to poor maintenance and errors on the part of the captain and crew.

In January 1943, however, Rear Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarines, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was killed in a plane crash.

[19] In November 1943, Carpender was replaced by Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, who ordered the final deactivation of the Mark 6 in all combat commands.

He had Commanders Chester Nimitz, Jr. and James McCallum continue technical studies of the Mark 6 and to develop improvements, but these revised exploders were just as unreliable as the earlier versions.

[22] In early 1944, Christie decided he wanted to make a war patrol and selected to ride with Walter T. Griffith in USS Bowfin.

[24] After Christie's return from his second combat patrol, Admiral Chester Nimitz recommended he and Lockwood meet in Brisbane and discuss joint submarine operations.

During the visit, Lockwood and Christie discussed technical issues, as well as the establishment of advanced bases in Mios Woendi and Saipan.

Additionally at this meeting, Christie found out his earlier recommendation for an army decoration to Griffith had apparently been blocked by Kinkaid.

[30] In October and November 1944, Christie received intelligence regarding German plans to operate a wolfpack of U-boats in Australian waters.

[31] In November 1944, Kinkaid relieved Christie of command of submarine operations at Fremantle, and assigned the position to Fife commencing 30 December.

Although no specific reason was given, Christie was convinced it was because he pushed Kinkaid too hard for Dealey's Medal of Honor, and for his process of awarding decorations in general.

Now that he was no longer under Kinkaid's command, Christie renewed his push to get Dealey awarded the Medal of Honor, this time by getting the endorsement for the decoration from MacArthur.