[2] The plan was supported by all of the Soviet-dominated states of the Warsaw Pact, However, during a NATO Council meeting in Paris in December 1957, it was rejected on the basis that it would leave Western Europe vulnerable to communist conventional armies that were perceived to be a relatively greater military threat.

The United States believed that supporting the plan would mean a loss of the balance of power in Europe – evidenced by the Eisenhower administration's response.

[3] Support for the plan effectively lost its traction when Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, tried to force West Germany to accept it during the Berlin Crisis of 1958–1959.

[5] Held on July 18, 1955, the summit sought to effectively end the Cold War and bring together the major powers to discuss peace based on sustained global security.

This summit marked the first major conference to introduce the issue of disarmament between West and East Germans, and in turn, bringing to the attention of international forums the matters of sustained European security premised on this geographic region.

This was in part due to the Polish recognition of East Germany, an act deemed unacceptable under the Hallstein Doctrine, adopted by the West German government at the time.

In November 1956, the state introduced a disarmament plan before the United Nations General Assembly that focused on reducing men in armies of great powers, banning nuclear weapons, and an overall reduction in military expenditures in all countries.

The plan called for renouncing the use of nuclear weapons, and furthermore, a compliance system based on aerial photography of locations in Europe where the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces were stationed.

[11] Rapacki's proposal at the UN General Assembly was largely made in the context of disarmament and limited to an undertaking by Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany to refrain from importing, manufacturing, or maintaining nuclear weapons within their territories.

In his speech, Rapacki focused on the proposal's value as a first step towards breaking the disarmament deadlock between the Soviet Union and the West and employed the term "constructive coexistence".

[9] Following the announcement of the Plan at the UN General Assembly, Rapacki sent a memorandum to the Warsaw embassies of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the UK, the US, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the USSR, and Sweden on February 14, 1958, detailing how the arrangement of a zone of disarmament would work.

A meeting was set up between Adam Rapacki and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in February 1958, which ended in favor of a nuclear-free zone as delineated in the plan.

On January 10, 1958, John Foster Dulles held a press conference expressing antagonism against a nuclear-free zone in Western Europe, suggesting that neutralization of Germany would significantly hurt NATO.

[22] The East German government informed the UN that they were willing to sign an agreement with West Germany contingent on their renunciation of producing nuclear weapons based on the Polish proposal.

On November 19, 1958, Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd made a statement that the Poles were sincere in their attempts for nuclear disarmament in Western Europe, however, the British government could not support such a nuclear-free zone.

[24] Canadian officials seemed to appreciate the fact that Poland was asserting sovereignty outside of the Warsaw Pact, and believed that supporting the Plan would both further their independence and strengthen the dialogue between NATO and the Soviet Union.

[25] Some Canadians in government such as Jules Leger, the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, openly defended the Rapacki Plan, and thought it to be an effort worth pursuing.

Scholars suggest that the country began to fear that such proposals would increase nuclear proliferation rather than limit it, as they had the potential to prompt European nations to develop their own armaments rather than rely singularly on the U.S.

[30] In the mid-1950s, seeking to pull troops out of Europe, Eisenhower pushed for the greater nuclear armament of Western European countries, notably that of West Germany.

[14] Przemysław Ogrodziński, a socialist activist and Polish diplomat, rose to the position of Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Rapacki's tenure.

[35] While Gomulka's policies were eventually approved by Moscow,[34] his aggressive style of independence in pursuing programs like the Rapacki Plan later soured his relations with fellow Warsaw Pact leaders.