On the night of 1 November as Gia Long Palace was besieged, Vietcong radio in South Vietnam had urged the Vietnamese people, the National Liberation Front and ARVN loyalists to resist the coup.
The principle chiefs of security and the secret police, on which mainly depended the protection of the regime and the repression of the revolutionary movement, have been eliminated, purges.
[5] While these conferences were taking place, the Military Revolutionary Council as it called itself, distributed leaflets and press releases proclaiming the dissolution of the National Assembly and the abolition of the Diệm-Nhu government based on the constitution of 1956.
[5] They condemned the recent legislative elections as "dishonest and fraudulent" and imposed martial law, announced a curfew and ordered the release of all jailed monks and students.
Senior American officers expressed optimism about the new junta: "They're putting some young tigers in command, and they could make an all-out effort to finish off the Vietcong".
A subsequent State Department message stressed the need to publicly emphasize the fact that the coup was an expression of national will by citing the near unanimous support of key military and civilian leaders.
The message further stressed the importance of Vice President Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ in a quick return to constitutional rule and the need, therefore, for the junta to include him in an interim regime.
Lodge replied affirmatively, indicating the United States should encourage other friendly countries to publicly recognize the new junta first with the assurance that the US would follow suit shortly thereafter.
[6] On the afternoon of 3 November, two days after the coup, Đôn and Kim visited Lodge at the US Embassy in Saigon, explaining that Minh was busy in conversations with Thơ on the new government.
The generals explained that they had decided on a two tier government structure with a military committee overseen by Minh presiding over a regular cabinet that would be predominantly civilian with Tho as Prime Minister.
[5] On 5 November, South Vietnam's new Foreign Minister sent a message to the Embassy officially informing Lodge of the change of government, and expressing the hope that relations between the two countries would continue and be strengthened.
The State Department approved Lodge's proposed reply of recognition the following day, and under the pressure of other governments and the media, announced its intention to recognize the junta on 7 November in Washington.
The Trưng Sisters were a 3rd-century AD pair who are venerated in Vietnam for their role in driving Chinese occupiers from the country, but Madame Nhu had modeled their features on her own as she fancied herself as a modern-day reincarnation.
The crowds swarmed onto the grounds of Gia Long Palace in the midst of what U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission William Trueheart called a "Mardi gras" atmosphere.
Xá Lợi had been at the heart of violent government raids by Nhu's Special Forces on 21 August 1963 which had left an estimated three-figure death toll across the country.
[8] Frederick Nolting, who had been US ambassador to South Vietnam from 1961 until his removal in August due to his perceived closeness to Diệm, did not share the enthusiasm over Diem's fall.
[10] Hilsmand did admit that Lodge's removal of the Saigon chief of the CIA, John H. Richardson was "terribly important" in signaling Washington's displeasure.
As a result, General Định told the press that Nhu had "entered negotiations" with North Vietnam for a peace settlement through the Polish representative on the International Control Commission that was charged with enforcing the Geneva Accords.
Rusk denied that the Americans had a "decisive influence" and insisted that it was a "South Vietnamese affair" but he realized that "our press problem is likely to be pinpointed on US involvement".
John Mecklin claimed that the White House put "direct, relentless, table-hammering pressure on Diem such as the United States had seldom before attempted with a sovereign, friendly government".
Colby agreed with his colleagues that Richardson's removal was a major factor, regarding it as "a policy decision just to indicate the end of a close relationship with Nhu".
Time declared in its cover story that US economic aid reductions and public criticism of Diệm's policies towards the Buddhists had "set the scene for the coup" and made US denials "misleading".
A picture of Taylor, Minh and Walt Rostow on the tennis court in Saigon in October was printed with the caption "There could be no doubt that the US encouraged the coup".
It opined that Kennedy's CBS television interview with Walter Cronkite on 2 September in which the president called for "changes in policy and perhaps with personnel" amounted to a "virtual invitation to insurrection".
It noted that from August and afterwards, Washington "variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government".
On 17 November, the Central Committee of the NLF issued another series of demands: Lodge cabled Washington after the coup, optimistically declaring, "The prospects now are for a shorter war, thanks to the fact that there is this new government, provided the generals stay together.
[15] Kennedy penned in a memo that the assassination was "particularly abhorrent" and blamed himself for approving Cable 243 which authorized Lodge to explore coup options in the wake of Nhu's attacks on the Buddhist pagodas.
"[17] One of the main arguments put forward by the junta in the aftermath of the coup was that it was necessary to prevent Diệm and Nhu from doing a deal with Hanoi to neutralize Vietnam.
[19] The U.S. conveyed to the French that they felt that military success was much more probable with Diệm and Nhu gone, removing the need for peace talks with North Vietnam.
The American ambassador told de Gaulle that the new regime in Saigon would have better prospects of a thaw in relations with Laos and Cambodia, and asked the French to use their influence in Phnom Penh to help.