At the 1996 Victorian election, a Liberal Party government led by Jeff Kennett was re-elected on a platform of continued rationalisation of the state's public services.
At the company's insistence, the government also decided to lease the majority of the intrastate network itself to the winning bidder, on the basis that the control of both track and trains would enable Freight Victoria to implement greater efficiencies.
[5] In the lead up to the 1999 election, it became imperative for the Labor Party under Steve Bracks to focus on country towns most affected by the cuts to services over the previous decade, as the Liberal government appeared to be a strong chance for re-election in the suburbs of Melbourne.
[3] On 8 September, in addition to promising a Melbourne Airport rail link, Bracks announced a new commitment to invest $80 million in the Geelong, Ballarat, Bendigo and Traralgon country rail lines, enabling new private infrastructure manager Freight Victoria to increase speed limits from 80 km/h (50 mph) to 130 km/h (81 mph) and therefore reduce travel times to main regional centres.
[8] The election of 18 September 1999, resulted in a hung parliament with both major parties attempting to secure a deal with three independent representatives in order to form government.
The company's argument, that the proposed pricing arrangement did not adequately reimburse FA for capital investment in the network, was supported by academics from Melbourne Business School.
[16] By the end of March 2001, the Liberal state opposition had begun to claim that there was little private sector interest in the project, and that the government would be forced to contribute its full cost should it go ahead.
[17][18] A launch was held in June, where the government hoped to find investment support, but Bracks and Batchelor conceded they would fully fund the project if no additional finance could be found.
The leading companies for the five bids – Alstom, Baulderstone, John Holland, Leighton Contractors and Downer EDI Rail – agreed to attempt to meet the government's target travel times, investigate electrifying the line to Geelong as part of the project, and finalise the requirements for property acquisition and additional costs.
[25] Meanwhile, the government suffered sustained criticism of the project following the release of research commissioned by the National Party and carried out by ACIL Consulting, which claimed that the economic benefits of fast rail had been massively overestimated.
However, the government denied the report's findings, and the Liberal Party refused to support the Nationals' stark opposition to the project, though it agreed the episode showed the plan had not been sufficiently scrutinised.
[27] The state's objectives included improving journey times "to the maximum extent possible on a value-for-money basis", maintaining a suitable standard of safety, achieving sustained patronage growth, minimising cost to the taxpayer and transferring risk to the private sector, and meeting ambitious deadlines for completion.
[29] The project had five key components: The delivery of these objectives entailed upgrading 500 km of rail lines from the track bed up, installing 400 new and upgraded railway signals, installing more than 460,000 concrete sleepers, upgrading 170 level crossings, introducing new rail safety systems (later including the Train Protection & Warning System), developing new train timetables with improved services, and the laying of new fibre optic cable along the rail corridors to allow for better signalling and also provide enhanced broadband facilities in regional area The VLocity trains began running at increased speeds from December 2005, with regular 160 km/h services beginning on the Geelong, Ballarat, and Bendigo lines on 3 September 2006.
Between Kyneton and Bendigo the double-track line was singled to allow for better clearances past heritage structures, although retaining some sections of double track to form long crossing loops.
Despite being described as "the most ambitious reworking of country passenger train services not just in Victoria's but in Australia's history",[35] the RFR project was widely and consistently criticised throughout the development, implementation and service introduction stages, with media, transport experts and Opposition politicians attacking governance failures, cost blowouts, and the project's failure to achieve its original headline promises in any meaningful way.
However, in the years following completion of the RFR project, patronage on V/Line services began to increase at an unprecedented rate, stimulating continued investment in rollingstock and infrastructure.
Consequently, a decade after the project's completion, the RFR program had been identified as the beginning of a radical transformation of the role and nature of regional rail services in Victoria.
[45] The promised spin-off, broadband access to communities such as Ballan and VLine commuters, did not eventuate due to the government's unwillingness to fund breakout points.
[47] Despite some initial setbacks, by 2009 the project was being hailed as an unexpected success, spurring record passenger numbers and substantially contributing to the growth of regional Victorian economies.