With fellow authors, he produced a 2200-page document detailing their views on the inner workings of Lehman Brothers, and possible avenues for proceedings against culpable directors and shareholders.
Bear Stearns' March 2008 failure revealed the flaws of both the at-that-time-typical investment bank model as well as the deepening sub-prime crisis.
Counterparty confidence in Lehman began to decline and the executives felt they needed to manipulate their financial statements in order to halt further erosion.
Multiple sources from the time note there was no substance to transaction except to remove unwanted assets, a significant violation of generally accepted accounting principles in the United States.
Regarding liquidity, throughout 2008 Lehman made false claims of having billions of dollars in available cash to repay counterparties when in reality, significant portions of the reported amounts were in fact encumbered or otherwise unavailable for use.
In a written letter in June 2008, Lehman Senior VP Matthew Lee advised the auditors and Audit Committee that he thought Repo 105 was being used improperly.
Following consideration of the report, the Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board announced an investigation into Ernst & Young's role in the bank's collapse.