The civilians, continuing the 1923 Revolution, wanted to remove the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Borges de Medeiros, while the military were against the president of Brazil, Artur Bernardes.

The tenentists' military authority, general Isidoro Dias Lopes, and the "civilian leader of the revolution", Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, were not in Rio Grande do Sul.

In the Missões region, the rebels concentrated in São Luiz Gonzaga, where captain Luís Carlos Prestes was designated commander in a letter from general Isidoro.

[1] Meanwhile, in the middle of the civil war, general Isidoro Dias Lopes, future commander of the revolt in São Paulo, was in Rio Grande do Sul contacting opposition leaders.

On 5 October, civil and military liaison officers in Rio Grande do Sul met with generals João Francisco and Olinto Mesquita de Vasconcelos in Foz do Iguaçu.

[30] In Buenos Aires, Assis Brasil had been purchasing weapons since the beginning of October, smuggling them, inside fruit boxes, across the Argentine border in Paso de los Libres.

[41] In Uruguaiana, Juarez Távora crossed the Argentine border the night before, meeting with opposition colonel Áfrico Serpa and other military personnel, including the inspector of the 5th RCI, Ambire Cavalcanti.

In response, agents cut the telegraph line to Rosário do Sul on 1 November and transmitted to Livramento the news of the destruction of several sections of the railway, halting shipment.

The revolutionary command did not want to deliberately harm the population and tried to impose a regularized process, with limits, but considering the size of the troops, not all of them with firm discipline, excesses and violence occurred.

[55] The warlords referred to themselves with officer ranks, and each group of irregulars was independent and only obeyed its leader, only recognizing the hierarchical superiority of Honório Lemes, the only one with the title of general.

[68] Even so, Juarez Távora and João Alberto Lins de Barros praised the tactical sense of Honório Lemes, "the greatest expert on the roads, shortcuts, river crossings and wetlands in that entire region".

[69] The American consulate reported to the State Department the call of 1,900 men from the Public Forces of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Bahia to Porto Alegre.

The contingent sent to the task included provisional members of the Military Brigade, loyal to the government, and a section of the 2nd Horse Artillery Group, under João Alberto Lins de Barros, committed to the uprising.

His support was complete, but the intended attack on Alegrete could only take place in the early hours of 30 October, as he had to wait for the arrival of Juarez Távora with reinforcements from Uruguaiana.

[84][85][76] Alegrete would resist, as it was a PRR stronghold, under the influence of Osvaldo Aranha,[76] and the base of the 2nd Cavalry Division, whose commander, General Firmino Borba, mobilized the remainder of the 2nd Horse Artillery Group and the 2nd Auxiliary Corps.

[92] According to João Alberto, however, there was no military professionalism in this movement: "instead of a covered march, avoiding demonstrations that could reveal us to the enemy, the general acted carelessly, without thinking about the opposing forces that were supposed to be distant".

From there, he continued to the weakly defended municipality of Rosário, where he would confiscate the army cavalry at the National Stud Farm of Saicã and the Horse Supply Post from São Simão.

[65][82][99] The attack on Saicã prompted a note of protest from the Minister of War, marshal Setembrino de Carvalho, accusing Honório Lemes of breaking the Pact of Pedras Altas.

[82] The loyalist persecution column was in the same municipality,[b] commanded by lieutenant colonel Augusto Januário Corrêa and consisting of the 15th AC and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment of the Military Brigade, coming from Santana do Livramento.

[105] In the pursuit of Honório Lemes, lieutenant colonel Júlio Rafael de Aragão Bozzano, commander of the 11th AC, a lawyer, journalist, and intendant of Santa Maria stood out.

[68] On 5 December, Honório finally joined forces with Zeca Neto on the banks of the Camaquã river, south of Caçapava, but was defeated in the region of Passo do Velhaco.

Sinhô Cunha's provisionals beheaded twelve prisoners, including eight sailors, creating an international incident and forcing Brazil to send its formal apology to Uruguay.

[e] Loyalist resistance was organized by Osvaldo Aranha, a local PRR politician, and captain Carneiro Pinto,[80][116] counting on a provisional body of the Military Brigade, made up of veterans from the previous year, and the 1st GACav.

[118] The rebel reinforcements coming from the south were unable to help;[f] in Uruguaiana they received no communication from their comrades, they feared a loyalist attack from Alegrete and were distracted by the call of some officers from the 7th RCI, from Livramento.

[131] On 30 December, the Buenos Aires newspaper La Nación speculated about the three remaining alternatives for the revolutionaries: "cross the Uruguay River [...], try to open the way to the north, [...], or else fight for the honor of arms, without plausible hope of victory [...].

[129][139] The Military Brigade sent colonel Claudino Nunes Pereira with reinforcements,[i] but on 1 January, Siqueira Campos' detachment forced a gap through which the entire column crossed the Ijuí River.

[153] Until its junction with the remnants of the São Paulo Revolt, Prestes' column spent 45 days in the Contestado region, in western Paraná and Santa Catarina, where it operated as a guerrilla group.

[167][168][169][170] The conflict left a large number of liberating civilian and soldiers from the army, navy and Public Force of São Paulo in exile in Argentina and Uruguay.

The first was in September 1925, with a border invasion by Honório Lemes; the committed military elements did not rise up, and the civilian commander surrendered to Osvaldo Aranha and Flores da Cunha.

[171] The alliance with tenentism gave prestige and national projection to the Rio Grande do Sul opposition, at the cost of new dissent within their ranks and the distancing of political leaders from their local bases.