Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson, KCB, FRS (6 January 1809 – 27 July 1889)[1] was a British naval officer, who served as two five-year terms as Controller of the Navy from February 1861 to February 1871, and was therefore responsible for the procurement of warships at a time when the Royal Navy was changing over from unarmoured wooden ships to ironclads.

[13] On 13 February 1856, Robinson was appointed captain of the 102-gun screw three-decker Royal George, which was one of the ships that transported the British Army back from the Crimea after the conclusion of the campaign there.

[14] On 25 August 1856, Robinson was appointed Superintendent of the Steam Reserve at Devonport, flying his flag in the 60-gun screw 'blockship' Ajax.

In the person of Chief Constructor, Edward Reed, the Controller was able to combine the new architecture of naval power with its execution.

In urging the construction of several such vessels in 1866, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson, stated that they were 'intended either for coast defences, or the attack of shipping in an enemy harbour.'...

This was never systematically codified as anything like a 'strategy' in the modern sense of the word, and indeed for every blazing reference to 'assaulting an enemy's coast' in British newspapers, many more authorities expressed their professional doubts.

The 'coast defence' battleships, along with the gun- and later torpedo boats were, in the words of Andrew Lambert, 'the cutting edge of British strategy, their function... to destroy fleets sheltering inside their bases..."[20] But a plan was never actually formulated (the closest being the disastrous Dardanelles campaign in the First World War) and coastal defence counter-measures—iron-plated granite forts mounting the heaviest ordnance possible, mines, and obstructions--'counter deterred' much more effectively, cheaply and reliably.

Historian John Beeler speculated that "Throughout the 1860s [Robert] Spencer Robinson consistently rated the British ironclad fleet inferior to its cross-Channel rival, in order to lend weight to his campaigns for enlarged and accelerated shipbuilding programmes.

In late 1867, for instance, he wrote that a 'comparison was made between the armoured ships of England and those of France; it was pointed out [in the autumn of 1866] that, on the whole we were manifestly inferior in the number of our ironclads to that Power, taking into account those that were building...

[Robert] Spencer Robinson [and his colleagues] Milne and Corry thus serves as wonderful examples of what defence analyst Edward Luttwak has termed 'amoral navalism'; professionals agitating for the enlargement of the force at their disposal without regard for either the constraints imposed by politics and foreign policy (or any other factors for that matter), or the actual menace posed by rival forces.

Problems with ironclad construction, arguments over design in everything from turrets to plating schemes to ordnance, and rising costs were real.

Initially Childers had the support of the influential Controller of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Sir [Robert] Spencer Robinson.

"[23] According to Beeler, "In 1870 [Robert] Spencer Robinson counted the British ironclad force at thirty-nine ships, and that of France at forty-one, claiming that France had a superiority of numbers in heavy guns, and concluded that '[a]t this moment an alliance between France and so small a naval power as Holland would turn most seriously the naval preponderance against England...' With all this [the First Naval Lord] [Admiral S.C.] Dacres cordially concurred, pointing out especially that '[t]there is no doubt that we are outnumbered by some ten vessels of the special service class [i.e. coast and harbour defence vessels] of French ships.

'""[21] After the end of the Franco-Prussian War and "Robinson's departure from the Admiralty, calmer more balanced heads prevailed, and more rational assessments of the technological disparity between the two battlefleets were soon forthcoming.

But by the time these vessels were in anything like real danger (as late as 1877 they were still reported as perfectly sea-going) technology had already made both their 4.75-inch-thick iron armour plating and their capacity for mounting the latest heavy guns (over 30 tons each) hopelessly obsolete.

[2] The New York Times published the following on 13 September 1871: "The entire ship-building interest of Hull, England, is reported to have been purchased by a Company, of who the leading officers are Vice-Admiral Robert Spencer Robinson and Naval Constructor Reid [sic].

[26] Robinson died at his residence 61 Eaton Place, London on 27 July 1889,[2] and is buried in Kensal Green Cemetery.