[citation needed][7] The Sea Tigers were led by Soosai, with their main base at Mullaitivu, on the north-eastern coast of Sri Lanka.

The rebels found it easy to travel back to Sri Lanka from training camps and smuggled in their supplies from India via small crafts cross the Palk Strait.

In August 1996, the Sea Tigers attacked a cargo vessel MV Princess Wave while it was loading Ilmenite from Pulmoddai, a traditional Tamil homeland.

In May 1997, Sea Tigers badly damaged another cargo vessel by placing two to five kilograms of explosives on the hull (starboard or right side), below the water, just near the propeller.

The most significant use of combined operations was at the Second Battle of Elephant Pass in the Spring of 2000, when some 1,200 cadres were landed behind enemy lines.

The Sri Lanka Army launched heavy artillery barrages across the Northern Front following the sea battle.

Thus with the beginning of the Fourth Eelam War the Sea Tigers faced a more organised enemy adapted to asymmetric warfare.

Initially stopping at 200 nautical miles to unload cargo to smaller boats, the LTTE was forced to carry out operations further away due to loss of ships and in 2007 SLN followed and sank them near Australian territory.

During naval engagements the Sea tigers who relied on swarming and suicide boats found themselves outnumbered due to the introduction of the Arrow-class which was of higher quality.

The use of sonar alongside simpler methods such as booms as well as increased patrols around ports countered frogmen actions.

[17] As a result of the military offensive that ended in May 2009, in the North of the country the Sri Lanka Armed Forces first recaptured all of the western seaboard that was once controlled by the LTTE, thus depriving the Sea Tigers of the bases it had in the west.

These boats could be up to 15 meters long, and were usually equipped with four to six 250 Hp outboard engines and a mixture of weaponry: light and heavy machine guns mainly of 12.7mm, 14.5mm calibers and grenade launchers.

While inferior to the patrol craft of the Sri Lankan Navy, the use of swarm tactics together with suicide boats negated the disadvantage.

The Sea Tigers also manned a number of larger merchant vessels (sailing under various flags) used for smuggling equipment from neighboring countries.

[29] As there were no large ports under LTTE control, the supplies were loaded onto smaller vessels that could land directly on the beaches.

[30] From March 2003 to October 2007, the Sri Lankan Navy destroyed ten of these vessels in the Indian Ocean, crippling the LTTE's supply line.

[27]Frogmen was a naval commando also served with the Sea Tigers and were used in sinking at least one freighter at the Sri Lankan Navy base at Kankesanturai - KKS, at the northern point of the Jaffna peninsula.

[37] India regarded the Sea Tigers as a "nuisance" in South Asian waters[38] and the Indian Armed Forces and State Government of Tamil Nadu had increased naval surveillance in the region.

In many ways the Sea Tigers had adapted and challenged a larger and more modern Navy, due to their tactics being based on the understanding of SLN operations cycles, doctrine and reaction time.

In the year 1996, Lawrence Thilakar, a member of the LTTE central committee, said that the Tigers would target both Sri Lankan military inside and outside supply lines.

[42] A second development was the LTTE's declaration on 15 July 1997, that all merchant vessels taking supplies northward to Jaffna peninsula would be considered legitimate military targets.

The LTTE accused Sri Lanka of "shipping war materials to Jaffna under the pretext of supplying food and necessities for the people" .

[43]On 28 August 1995,[44] Tigers intercepted and taken control of the passenger ferry Irish Mona near the coastal city of Mullaitivu.

The ferry was run by the government of Sri Lanka with the help of a paramilitary group known as EPDP, transporting people from the Jaffna islands to the mainland.

[44] On 1 July 1997, Sea Tigers captured another Sri Lankan supply ship named MV Misen off the north-western coast of Pesalai.

Prior to the ship's bombing, the captain, V. N. Capro, told the Sri Lankan Navy the LTTE was investigating them and that settlement could be reached through negotiation.

[58] On 26 December, an Indian newspaper, The Hindu, accused the Tamil Tigers of forcing the crew to abandon the vessel and risking their lives.

"[60]The MV Sik Yang, a 2,818-ton Malaysian-flag cargo ship which sailed from Tuticorin, India on May 25, 1999 was reported missing in waters near Sri Lanka.

A report published on June 30, 1999 states that the vessel "may have been" captured by the LTTE as it went missing in the waters of Sri Lanka, according to 'Anti-Shipping Activity Messages'.

[61] While some of these missions have been purely opportunist in nature, most have, in some manner, been executed to support the group's on-ground war effort.