[2] From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the KPA used these tactics to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south.

[4] Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union the North Koreans were aware the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle.

Its mission in the forthcoming attack was to outflank and destroy the US troops at Naktong Bulge by capturing the Miryang and Samnangjin areas to cut off the US 2nd Division's route of supply and withdrawal between Taegu and Pusan.

Consequently, they expected lighter resistance; the 24th troops were exhausted from months of fighting but the 2nd Division men were fresh and newly arrived in Korea.

[29] The raiding force, E Company, was still in its regimental reserve position about 2 miles (3.2 km) west of Yongsan, getting ready with the engineer platoon to move to the crossing site.

[30] From 21:30 until shortly after midnight the KPA 9th Division crossed the Naktong at a number of places and climbed the hills quietly toward the 9th Infantry river line positions.

[26] A truck stopped at the bottom of the hill, a whistle sounded, then came a shouted order, and KPA soldiers started climbing the slope.

[31] A strong KPA force surprised and delivered heavy automatic fire on it at 03:30 from positions astride the road east of the pass.

[28] With the critical parts of Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge, the best defensive terrain between Yongsan and the river, the KPA controlled the high ground.

[33] The 42 men of the 2nd Platoon, B Company, 23rd Infantry held outpost positions on seven hills covering a 2,600 yards (2,400 m) front along the east bank of the Naktong north of Pugong-ni.

[34] This force was unable to reach C Company, but Jenson collected stragglers from it and seized high ground astride this main approach to Changnyong near Ponch'o-ri above Lake Samul-po, and went into a defensive position there.

[35] Beginning at 09:30 and continuing throughout the rest of the day, the light aviation section of the division artillery located front-line units cut off by the KPA, and made fourteen airdrops of ammunition, food, water, and medical supplies.

[35] Keiser hoped he could organize a defense along the Changnyong-Yongsan road east of the Naktong River, and prevent KPA access to the passes eastward leading to Miryang and Ch'ongdo.

[37] The Far East Command requested the US Navy to join in the air effort, and the US Seventh Fleet turned back from its strikes in the Inch'on-Seoul area and sped southward at full steam toward the southern battle front.

[35] In the US 2nd Division sector KPA troops were at the edge of Yongsan, the gateway to the corridor leading 12 miles (19 km) eastward to Miryang and the main Pusan-Mukden railroad and highway.

After several hours, 2nd Platoon of A Company sent a patrol down the hill to Agok to obtain supplies abandoned there during the night, returning later with much needed water, rations, and ammunition.

In this desperate action, Private First Class Luther H. Story, a weapons squad leader, fought so tenaciously that he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

[44] In the meantime, Task Force Manchu was still holding its position along the Naktong River, about 5 miles (8.0 km) north of where A Company had been destroyed on the southern end of the line.

Private First Class Joseph R. Ouellette, of H Company, left the perimeter to gather weapons, ammunition, and grenades from the KPA dead.

[45] Only 45 minutes later KPA antitank fire came in on the knob and two machine guns from positions northward and higher on the slope of Hill 209 swept the perimeter.

Soon, mortars emplaced on a neighboring high finger ridge eastward registered on Schmitt's perimeter and continued firing until dark.

[47] As the day passed, with ammunition down to about one clip per man and only a few grenades left and no help in sight, McDoniel decided to abandon the position that night.

Master Sergeant Travis E. Watkins, still alive in his paralyzed condition, refused efforts of evacuation, saying that he did not want to be a burden to those who had a chance to get away.

[48][49] Members of Task Force Manchu who escaped from Hill 209 brought back considerable intelligence information of KPA activity in the vicinity of the Paekchin ferry crossing site.

Upon receiving this report the battalion commander requested permission by radio to remain in his present position and try to obstruct the movement of KPA reinforcements and supplies.

[54] On the morning of September 1 the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the KPA 9th Division, in their first offensive of the war, stood only a few miles short of Yongsan after a successful river crossing and penetration of the US line.

[55][56] The 3rd Regiment had been left at Inch'on, but division commander Major General Pak Kyo Sam felt the chances of capturing Yongsan were strong.

[26][60] At 09:35 September 2, while the KPA were attempting to destroy the engineer troops at the southern edge of Yongsan and clear the road to Miryang,[38] Walker spoke by telephone with Major General Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, Far East Command in Tokyo.

On September 19 the UN discovered the KPA had abandoned much of the Pusan Perimeter during the night, and the UN units began advancing out of their defensive positions and occupying them.

[62] However, once again the fatal weakness of the KPA had cost it victory after an impressive initial success—its communications and supply were not capable of exploiting a breakthrough and of supporting a continuing attack in the face of massive air, armor and artillery fire that could be concentrated against its troops at critical points.