By eliminating a number of long-standing issues, the terms eventually made it possible for England and the Dutch Republic to unite against the expansionist policies pursued by Louis XIV of France.

[13] The Atlantic trade was a three way process, whereby slaves from West Africa were transported to Sugar plantations in the Caribbean, which in turn were supplied by colonies in North America.

[15] In taking these actions, the Dutch were reassured by their 1662 defensive treaty with France, under which Louis XIV agreed to provide military support if they were attacked by England.

[16] [f] In return, the Dutch undertook not to interfere with French actions in the Spanish Netherlands, but by 1664, many were concerned by the prospect of having an expansionist France as a neighbour, rather than a weakened Spain.

[18] This was partially due to the complexity of the Dutch political system, which made it difficult to reach consensus between the different provinces and powerful trade groups like the VOC.

It also reflected de Witt's belief Parliament would not approve funds for an expensive naval war, a view shared by many English politicians, including Charles' chief minister Lord Clarendon.

[17] For his part, Louis XIV feared an Anglo-Dutch conflict might draw in Spain or the Holy Roman Empire, and impede his efforts to acquire the Spanish Netherlands.

[20] Aware of his reluctance, Charles II saw no reason to make concessions, while Sir George Downing, his Ambassador in The Hague, claimed recent financial losses meant the Dutch could not afford a war.

[18] Other advisors argued the Franco-Dutch treaty only applied to defensive actions, so provoking the Dutch into declaring war would give Louis XIV the chance to remain neutral.

[22] Some historians argue that just as the tactics used by 17th century armies were transformed by the Military Revolution, the Anglo-Dutch Wars marked a similar change in naval practice.

[25] Difficulties in communicating orders meant during combat many captains focused on avoiding collisions rather than engaging the enemy, making battles chaotic and often indecisive.

[27] Based on lessons learned from the First Anglo-Dutch War, post-1653 the Dutch navy was re-organised around sixty-four newly built and larger Ships of the line, each with between 40 and 60 guns.

Downing, and other observers who argued the Dutch could not afford a war, overlooked recent reforms that improved their credit, and made it relatively easy to raise money.

[34] De Witt ordered his naval commander Jacob van Wassenaer to bring the English fleet to battle, although his ships were inferior in organisation, training, discipline and firepower.

[41] Reports Charles was negotiating an alliance with Spain meant he also stepped up attempts to mediate a settlement, but the English in general remained deeply suspicious of French intentions.

[43] Downing now contacted the Orangist party in Overijssel, which had suffered severely from von Galen's invasion, asking that they demand the States General make peace with England.

[40] De Witt's position was too strong for this to succeed, and on 11 December he declared the only acceptable peace terms were a return to the status quo ante bellum, or a quick end to hostilities under a uti possidetis clause.

[46] The payments promised to von Galen by Charles largely failed to materialise, and when Brandenburg-Prussia threatened to attack Münster, he made peace with the Republic at Cleves in April.

Despite the French declaration of war, Charles knew Louis wanted to avoid being dragged into the conflict, and through informal correspondence was aware he considered Dutch demands excessive.

[55] In the initial stages of the Four Days' Battle, fought from 11 to 15 June, the Dutch inflicted heavy damage on their opponents, before the return of the detached squadron forced them to withdraw.

[57] Although the Dutch suffered heavy casualties and many ships were badly damaged, their fleet remained intact, while lack of money meant the English could scarcely afford to pay their sailors or purchase supplies.

[61] Since Charles refused to make the concessions to Parliament which would allow him to continue the war, his only option was to initiate peace talks, which began in March at Breda.

[citation needed] Aware of Charles's general intentions, although not of the secret treaty, de Witt decided to attempt to end the war with a single stroke.

[74][75] A Dutch force under Admiral Abraham Crijnssen, organised by the province of Zeeland, not the States General, arrived at Cayenne in February 1667 and captured Suriname from the English in the same month.

The Battle of Nevis restored English naval control in the Caribbean and allowed the early recapture of Antigua and Montserrat and an unsuccessful attack on St Kitts soon after.

[79] In April, a new English squadron of nine warships and two fireships under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir John Harman sailed for the West Indies, reaching them in early June.

Harman encountered the French with seven larger and 14 smaller warships and three fireships under la Barre anchored under the batteries of Fort St Pierre, Martinique.

Fears of growing French power meant that Johan de Witt and many of his fellow Dutch regenten preferred a quick end to the war with the English.

[82] The treaty allowed the English to keep possession of New Netherland, while the Dutch kept control over Pulau Run, Fort Cormantin and the valuable sugar plantations of Suriname, while also regaining Tobago, St Eustatius, and its West African trading posts.

[90] The Alliance between the Dutch Republic, England and Sweden was formed to mediate between France and Spain and forced Louis to temporarily abandon his plans for the conquest of the southern Netherlands.