Negotiations between Berlin and Paris resolved the crisis on 4 November 1911: France took over Morocco as a protectorate in exchange for territorial concessions to German Cameroon from the French Congo.

[2] In Britain, David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a dramatic "Mansion House" speech on 21 July 1911 – with the consent of prime minister H. H. Asquith and Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, bypassing the non-interventionist majority in the Cabinet – that denounced the German move as an intolerable humiliation.

The French – after forcing the Sultan to request their assistance – prepared to send troops to help put down the rebellion under the pretext of protecting European lives and property in Fèz.

The stock market plunged by 30 per cent in a single day,[14] the public started cashing in currency notes for gold, and there was a run on the banks.

Germany ceded to the French colony of Tchad a small area of territory to the southeast of Fort Lamy (now part of Chad).

[19] The initial reaction in London was cautious: the Liberal government in Cabinet felt that France was largely responsible for triggering the crisis and ought therefore be urged to give ground.

One consequence of the crisis was that the French viewed German policy as motivated by bluff: Raymond Poincaré, the premier succeeding Caillaux in early 1912, observed that 'whenever we have adopted a conciliatory approach to Germany... she has abused it; on the other hand, on each occasion when we have shown firmness, she has yielded', drawing the conclusion that Berlin would only understand a forceful response.

[23] Kissinger labels the risk-taking in this crisis used to appease the nationalism-inclined journalists and agitated public while disregarding the true interests at stake elsewhere as "strategic frivolity".

[24] American historian Raymond James Sontag argued in 1933 that it was a comedy of errors that became a tragic prelude to the First World War: With Abd al-Hafid's capitulation and signing of the Treaty of Fes (30 March 1912), France established a full protectorate over Morocco, ending what remained of that country's formal independence.

British backing of France during the crisis reinforced the Entente between the two countries (and with Russia as well), increasing Anglo-German estrangement, deepening the divisions which would culminate in the First World War.

[26] This incident led Britain's Home Secretary Winston Churchill to conclude the Royal Navy must convert its power source from coal to oil, to preserve its supremacy.

France was thus able to guard her communications with her North African colonies, and Britain to concentrate more force in home waters to oppose the German High Seas Fleet.

"The Agadir crisis of 1911, which suddenly raised the spectre of a general European war and strikingly revealed the danger of Germany's encirclement by the Entente, crystallized Spengler's nascent vision of the future international political transformation of the West.