In July 1941, following a full-scale rebellion by communist Yugoslav Partisans and royalist Chetniks, the German military commander in Serbia pressured Milan Nedić's collaborationist government to deal with the uprisings under the threat of letting the armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia, Hungary, and Bulgaria occupy the territory and maintain peace and order in it.

[11] After the Red Army entered Serbia and Belgrade was liberated in October 1944, the corps retreated with the Germans into the Slovene Lands.

In November it was taken over by the Waffen-SS, and incorporated into the SFK: Serbisches Freiwilligen Korps (Serbian Volunteer Corps), an infantry unit composed of the various Nedić's collaborationist groups on the run.

The next day 234 members of Yugoslav National Movement (ZBOR), Ljotić's and Olćan's pre-war political party enlisted as the first volunteers.

[13] On 6 October, Milan Nedić, the Prime Minister of the Axis-installed puppet Government of National Salvation, appointed Mušicki to lead the Serbian Volunteer Command.

Weapons were mixed; besides German arms which were eventually supplied, foreign rifles and machine guns, especially those seized as war booty from the defeated Yugoslav forces were used.

The volunteers saw their first action on 17 September 1941 in Dražanj village near Grocka, clearing the area of communists with four Yugoslav Partisans and two SDK members killed.

In November before an offensive in the Republic of Užice Milan Nedić ordered that the SDK, Serbian State Guard and Kosta Pećanac's Chetniks should be put under joint command.

The Corps was put under the command of the German 113th Division with which they fought between 25 and 29 November after the majority of Partisan troops had escaped to the Italian zone.

Nedić intervened to secure Mušicki's release and he was back in command as soon as those Germans that were familiar with the case had left Belgrade at the end of 1942.

In western Serbia, SDK with gendarmerie, Germans and Chetniks attacked the Kosmaj, Valjevo and Suvobor Partisan battalions who had returned from Bosnia.

At the end of 1942 there were 12 companies in 5 battalions and Germans granted them formal recognition on 1 January 1943, by officially changing its designation to the Serbian Volunteer Corps.

Đurišić was soon captured by the Gestapo but under guarantees of Nedić and Ljotić was released on the condition that he put his troops under SDK command.

This renewed activity greatly worried the responsible German commanders, since the strength of the occupation forces had declined considerably during the relatively peaceful months of 1942.

The meeting was on 15 September 1943, and Nedić managed to secure an agreement for the reinforcement of the SDK by five additional battalions, with a further five to follow as circumstances permitted.

By 21 August 1944 the five-regiment SDK had reached a strength of 9,886 officers and men, and from its inception to September 1944 had suffered 700 killed and 1,800 wounded in action.

In mid-September 1944, a corps unit saved Draža Mihailović and the Chetnik Supreme Command in northwest Serbia from capture by the Partisans.

Hitler ordered to move SDK to Operational Zone of the Adriatic Littoral, and to put it under Higher SS and Police Leader of OZAK, under Commander in Chief South-West.

The 3rd regiment under Major Jovan Dobrosavljević delayed crossing the Sava as they were fighting the Partisans in Šabac and met up with the others later in Ruma.

From 19 December to the end of the month a major encircle-and-destroy operation was mounted from the garrison towns of Gorizia, Idrija, Postojna and Sežana aiming to eliminate the Partisan stronghold in the Trnovska Mountains.

The second group, under Police Major Dr Dippelhofer, consisted of the Ljubljana SS NCO School, Slovenian Domobranci, Chetniks and a 1,200-man Russian ROA unit.

Once off the few roads that encircle the area, the attacking forces were faced with extremely difficult terrain that limited their progress to a few kilometres each day, inhibited contact with neighbouring units, and greatly restricted the ability to rapidly bring up fresh supplies and heavy weapons.

Shortly thereafter, Hermann Neubacher, Hitler's special political representative for the Balkans, paid a visit to Ljotić in Trieste to discuss German fears about what would happen when the SDK and Chetnik forces in Istria came into contact with British and American units who were expected to move in that direction from Italy.

Meanwhile, Tito's 4th Partisan Army was advancing north along the coastal road from Novi Vinodolski, Croatia to liberate Istria, Trieste and all of central and western Slovenia.

In early April the 237th Infantry Division was rushed to the area, and within a few days defensive positions were established in a 21-kilometre arc to the east and north of the city.

Kuebler's appreciation of the situation was entirely correct, as on 22 April the general staff of Tito's 4th Army ordered a flanking movement to bypass the city.

As the battle for Rijeka moved toward its inevitable conclusion, SDK Regiments 2, 3, and 4 were sent to Ljubljana and transferred to the authority of SS-Obergruppenführer Erwin Rösener, HSSuPF for Carinthia, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of Army Group E's rear area.

A total collapse of German forces in the Balkans and in Italy was recognized as being only a matter of weeks if not days away, and Neubacher wanted to know Ljotić's plans for withdrawing and surrendering the SDK.

The next day, during the hours of darkness, Ljotić accidentally drove his car into a hole that had been blown in a bridge by Allied fighter-bombers.

[22] Some were executed almost immediately in the Kočevski Rog massacre, while the others were carted off along with 10,000 Slovenian Domobranci to the infamous Šentvid camp, near Ljubljana.