The German organisation benefited greatly from British incompetence in the use of tactical codes, R/T signalling in clear and an ineffective call-sign procedure from brigade to battalion at the front.

Lack of deliveries and the Eighth Army offensive forced a retreat to El Agheila from 4 December, crowding the Via Balbia, where British ambushes destroyed about half of the remaining Axis transport.

[15] Before dawn on 18 November, the Eighth Army advanced westwards from Mersa Matruh, crossed the Libyan border near Fort Maddalena, about 50 mi (80 km) south of Sidi Omar, then turned the north-west.

[24] By mid-afternoon, the break-out force had advanced some 3.5 mi (5.6 km) toward Ed Duda on the main supply road when they paused, as it became clear that the 7th Armoured Division would not link up.

[39][41] On 23 November, Totensonntag (Sunday of the Dead to the Germans) the 15th Panzer Division moved southwards and ran into the positions of the 7th Support Group which faced north-west and was equally surprised.

On the morning of 23 November, before the destruction of the 5th South African Infantry Brigade, Cunningham asked Auchinleck to meet him at the Eighth Army HQ to decide whether to continue Crusader.

On 25 November, the 15th Panzer Division set off north-east for Sidi Azeiz, found the area empty and was constantly attacked by the Desert Air Force.

Ariete, approaching Bir Ghirba (15 mi (24 km) north-east of Sidi Omar, from the west, was ordered towards Fort Capuzzo to clear any opposition and link with the 21st Panzer Division.

The garrison of Tugun, down to half their strength and exhausted and low on ammunition, food and water, surrendered on the evening of 25 November after it had defeated a British attack the previous night.

Afterwards Oberstleutnant Fritz Bayerlein wrote: On 25 November heavy fighting flared up again at Tobruk, where our holding force was caught between pincers, one coming from the south-east and the other from the fortress itself.

Neumann-Silkow felt the plan to have little chance of success and resolved to advance to Sidi Azeiz, where he believed there was a British supply dump, before he headed to Tobruk.

[59] At noon on 27 November, the 15th Panzer Division reached Bir el Chleta and met the 22nd Armoured Brigade, which had been reorganised as a composite regiment with less than 50 tanks.

[56] As night fell, the British tanks disengaged to replenish, inexplicably moving south, which left the route west open for the 15th Panzer Division.

[60] By 27 November, the situation of the Eighth Army had improved since XXX Corps had reorganised after the chaos of the breakthrough and the New Zealand Division had linked up with the Tobruk garrison.

[62] Once in Cairo, Auchinleck was persuaded by Air Marshal Tedder to relieve Cunningham and substituted him with his Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Neil Ritchie, promoting him to acting lieutenant-general.

When two Italian motorised battalions of Bersaglieri, with tanks, anti-tank guns and artillery, moved toward Sidi Rezegh, they overran a New Zealand field hospital and captured 1,000 patients and 700 medical staff.

The northern column was ambushed by the 5th New Zealand Infantry Brigade on the Bardia road, 10 mi (16 km) west of the port, near Menastir and "almost annihilated" (Playfair, 2004).

[81] The southern column, on the Trigh Capuzzo, met Goldforce (based on the Central India Horse reconnaissance regiment) and was subjected to an artillery bombardment and attacked by Blenheim bombers and Hurricane fighter-bombers.

When it was clear that the attack would fail, Rommel resolved to withdraw from the eastern perimeter of Tobruk to allow him to concentrate his strength against the growing threat of XXX Corps to the south.

The I and II battalions, 136th "Giovani Fascisti" Regiment in the hilltop position repulsed several attacks by British armour and Indian infantry units in the first week of December, Although Norrie had an overwhelming superiority in every arm in the area of Bir Gubi, the failure to concentrate them and co-ordinate the action of all arms in detail had allowed one Italian battalion group to frustrate the action of his whole corps and inflict heavy casualties on one brigade.the Eighth Army infantry were left vulnerable because Norrie had been ordered to send the 4th Armoured Brigade east due to the threat to Bardia and Sollum.

As dusk approached, the Afrika Korps and the Ariete Division intervened to relieve the Young Fascist garrison at Point 174 and attacked the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade.

[93] In a final action on the part of the 70th Division, the Polish Carpathian Brigade attacked elements of Brescia, followed the Axis retreat and captured the White Knoll position.

Due to the Germans' superior tactics and anti-tank artillery, British commanders preferred making a wide detour to attack their soft-skinned elements and lines of supply, to immobilise them.

[98] On 14 December, to the south, there was little activity from the Afrika Korps and the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade was limited to patrolling through a shortage of ammunition as supply problems multiplied.

[100] On 15 December, Brescia and Pavia, with Trento in close support, repelled a strong Polish–New Zealand attack, freeing the 15th Panzer Division, which had returned to the Gazala Line, to be used elsewhere.

The Poles and New Zealanders made good initial progress, but the Italians rallied well, and by noon it was clear to [General Alfred] Godwin-Austen that his two brigades lacked the weight to achieve a breakthrough on the right flank.

[103] The attackers also had suffered heavily in the engagement and the German commander was heard on a radio intercept to report the inability of his force to exploit his success because of the losses sustained.

Early on 16 December, only a small detachment was sent north, which caused serious confusion among Panzer Group Afrika's rear echelon but was not decisive and the rest of the brigade headed south to meet its petrol supplies.

On 27 December, during a three-day tank battle at El Haseia, the 22nd Armoured Brigade was severely depleted, which forced the vanguard of the Eighth Army to withdraw.

[107] The defences against artillery and aerial bombardment led to relatively few casualties but hunger and thirst forced General Fedele De Giorgis and Major Wilhelm Bach to capitulate on 17 January.