Singapore strategy

It aimed to deter aggression by Japan by providing a base for a fleet of the Royal Navy in the Far East, able to intercept and defeat a Japanese force heading south towards India or Australia.

The idea of invading Japan was rejected as impractical, but British planners did not expect that the Japanese would willingly fight a decisive naval battle against the odds.

[20] In 1934, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, began to press for a new naval build-up sufficient to fight Japan and the strongest European power.

[21] By 1938, the Treasury was losing its fight to stop rearmament; politicians and the public were more afraid of being caught unprepared for war with Germany and Japan than of a major financial crisis in the more distant future.

[23] In November 1918, the Australian Minister for the Navy, Sir Joseph Cook, had asked Admiral Lord Jellicoe to draw up a scheme for the Empire's naval defence.

He called for the creation of a British Pacific Fleet strong enough to counter the Imperial Japanese Navy, which he believed would require 8 battleships, 8 battlecruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 10 cruisers, 40 destroyers, 36 submarines and supporting auxiliaries.

While the United States had constructed a graving dock capable of taking battleships at Pearl Harbor between 1909 and 1919, the Royal Navy had no such base east of Malta.

[5] In April 1919, the Plans Division of the Admiralty produced a paper which examined possible locations for a naval base in the Pacific in case of a war with the United States or Japan.

They were therefore drawn to the concept of a blockade; from experience they were aware of the impact it could have on an island nation at the heart of a maritime empire and felt that economic pressure would suffice.

Some critical materials for which Japan relied heavily on imports were identified, including metals, machinery, chemicals, oil and rubber and many of the best sources were under British control.

By the 1930s the Admiralty was concerned that the United States and Japan were well ahead of Britain in this field and persuaded the Army and RAF to join with it in establishing the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre, which opened in July 1938.

[43] The Royal Navy was the world leader in naval aviation and the Sempill mission taught advanced techniques such as carrier deck landing, conducted training with modern aircraft and provided engines, ordnance and technical equipment.

[50] The former First Sea Lord, Sir Reginald Drax, who was brought out of retirement to advise on strategy, called for a "flying squadron" of four or five battleships, along with an aircraft carrier, some cruisers and destroyers, to be sent to Singapore.

[59] Part of their cost was met from a gift of £500,000 from Sultan Ibrahim of Johor for the Silver Jubilee of the coronation King George V. Three of the guns were given an all-round (360°) traverse and subterranean magazines.

The aircraft carrier HMS Eagle was able to sail undetected to within 135 miles (217 km) of Singapore and launch a series of surprise raids on the RAF airfields.

[64] In the 1920s, the conservative Nationalist Party government of Stanley Bruce favoured the Singapore strategy, which called for reliance on the Royal Navy, supported by a naval squadron as strong as Australia could afford.

[67] In petitioning a parsimonious government for more funds, the Australian Army had to rebut the Singapore strategy, "an apparently well-argued and well-founded strategic doctrine that had been endorsed at the highest levels of imperial decision-making".

It called for Australia to rely on a powerful air force, supported by a well-equipped army that could be rapidly expanded to meet an invasion threat, which would need a big munitions industry.

Labor politicians cited critics like Rear Admiral William Freeland Fullam, who drew attention to the vulnerability of warships to aircraft, naval mines and submarines.

Lavarack responded that the vast coastline of Australia would make a naval blockade very difficult and its considerable internal resources meant that it could resist economic pressure.

[76] In 1938, Lyons told UK High Commissioner Geoffrey Whiskard that he had formed the view that "Britain would not, or could not, offer any substantial defence assistance to Australia".

[83] With war with Germany now a reality, Menzies sent Richard Casey to London to seek reassurances about the defence of Australia in the event that Australian forces were sent to Europe or the Middle East.

[84] In November 1939, Australia and New Zealand were given assurances that Singapore would not be allowed to fall and that in the event of war with Japan, the defence of the Far East would take priority over the Mediterranean.

[49] Bruce, now Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom and Casey met with British Cabinet ministers on 20 November and left with the impression that, despite the assurances, the Royal Navy was not strong enough to deal with simultaneous crises in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East.

[87] The Chiefs of Staff Committee reported, The security of our imperial interests in the Far East lies ultimately in our ability to control sea communications in the south-western Pacific, for which purpose adequate fleet must be based at Singapore.

[88]In secret talks in Washington, D.C., in June 1939, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy, raised the possibility of an American fleet being sent to Singapore.

[95] In August 1940, the Chiefs of Staff Committee reported that the force necessary to hold Malaya and Singapore in the absence of a fleet was 336 first-line aircraft and a garrison of nine brigades.

Australia was represented by its three deputy service chiefs, Captain Joseph Burnett, Major General John Northcott and Air Commodore William Bostock.

There were spies in Singapore, such as Captain Patrick Heenan and a copy of the Chiefs of Staff's August 1940 appreciation was among the secret documents captured by the German surface raider Atlantis from the SS Automedon on 11 November 1940.

In a speech in the Australian House of Representatives in 1992, Prime Minister Paul Keating cited the sense of betrayal, I was told that I did not learn respect at school.