Sino–Arab relations (simplified Chinese: 中国与阿拉伯世界之间的关系; traditional Chinese: 中國與阿拉伯世界之間的關係; pinyin: Zhōngguó yǔ ālābó shìjiè zhī jiān de guānxì, Arabic: العلاقات بين الصين والعالم العربي, romanized: alealaqat bayn alsiyn walealam alearabii), have extended historically back to the Rashidun Caliphate, with important trade routes, and good diplomatic relations.
[1] From 2018, the relations became significantly warmer, with the PRC and the Arab countries exchanging state visits, establishing cooperation mechanism and providing support to each other.
[8] The word is thought to be a transcription of Persian Tāzik or Tāzī, derived from a nisba of the Arab tribe Ṭayyiʾ.
[27] The followers of the confession of the “Dashi” (the Arabs) have a means to denote the degrees of family relations, but it is degenerated and they don’t bother about it.
[28] An Arab envoy presented horses and a girdle to the Chinese in 713, but he refused to pay homage to the Emperor, said, he said "In my country we only bow to God never to a Prince".
Three Da shi ambassadors arrived at the Tang court in 798 A.D. A war which was raging between the Arabs and Tibetans from 785 to 804 benefited the Chinese.
[31] According to Professor Samy S. Swayd Fatimid missionaries made their Dawah in China during the reign of al-'Aziz bi-Allah.
[33][34][35][36][37][38] In 756, 3,000 Arab mercenaries joined the Chinese against An Lushan[39] A massacre of foreign Arab and Persian Muslim merchants by Tian Shengong happened during the An Lushan rebellion in the Yangzhou massacre (760),[40][41] since Tian Shengong was defecting to the Tang dynasty and wanted them to publicly recognized and acknowledge him, and the Tang court portrayed the war as between rebel hu barbarians of the Yan against Han Chinese of the Tang dynasty, Tian Shengong slaughtered foreigners as a blood sacrifice to prove he was loyal to the Han Chinese Tang dynasty state and for them to recognize him as a regional warlord without him giving up territory, and he killed other foreign Hu barbarian ethnicities as well whose ethnic groups were not specified, not only Arabs and Persians since it was directed against all foreigners.
[42][43] The Tang dynasty recovered its power decades after the An Lushan rebellion and was still able to launch offensive conquests and campaigns like its destruction of the Uyghur Khaganate in Mongolia in 840-847.
Several embassies from the Abbaside Caliphs to the Chinese Court are recorded in the T'ang Annals, the most important of these being those of (A-bo-lo-ba) Abul Abbas, the founder of the new dynasty, that of (A-p'u-ch'a-fo) Abu Giafar, the builder of Bagdad, of whom more must be said immediately; and that of (A-lun) Harun al Raschid, best known, perhaps, in modern days through the popular work, Arabian Nights.
The Abbasides or " Black Flags," as they were commonly called, are known in Chinese history as the Heh-i Ta-shih, " The Black-robed Arabs.
The Chinese government sponsored students like Wang Jingzhai and Muhammad Ma Jian to go the Al-Azhar University to study.
[54][55] In 1939 Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Ma Fuliang (馬賦良) were sent by the Kuomintang to Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Syria to gain support for China in the Second Sino-Japanese War.
[57] The Hui Muslim Imam Da Pusheng [zh] (达浦生) also toured the Middle East to confront Japanese propagandists in Arab countries and denounce their invasion to the Islamic world.
[60] Adam Hoffman and Roie Yellinek of the Middle East Institute wrote in May 2020 that the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which spread from China to the Arab states, has set a complex dynamic in relations between the sides, created an opportunity for solidarity and assistance, and at the same time exacerbating present challenges.
[61] In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates, signed a joint letter to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) defending China's treatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang.
Confucius Institutes are one of the major ways China invests soft power in the Arab countries and in the world.
It can be said that the Institutes, as an instrument of Chinese soft power, have effectively penetrated the Arab world and are welcomed without significant criticism.