Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong travelled to the Soviet Union to sign the treaty, one of only two times in his life that he left China.
[3] For the United States, it hoped that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan as soon as possible and support the KMT as the only legal government of China.
[5] Thus, although no representative from either party came to the meeting at Yalta, Roosevelt still made it clear that every treaty that included China's problems needed Chiang's approval in the agreement because of his friendship with the KMT.
[6] Later, after the victory of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War, fundamentally changed the pattern of Asia and the Far East forcing the Soviet Union to reassess and adjust its policy towards China.
To enhance the strength of the communist bloc against the US-led capitalist world in the international system of the Cold War, Stalin saw China under the leadership of CCP as a viable partner in checking US encroachment on the Soviet sphere of influence in East Asia.
[8] The CCP also needed the Soviet Union's support and assistance in its struggle to consolidate its rule and curb the attempts of the United States to overthrow the communist regime.
Moreover, the ideological opposition and hostility between China and the US-led western camp ruled out the possibility of receiving aid from the west necessitating, the establishment of a stable and predictable diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union.
[11] On the other hand, Mao was preoccupied with setting up China's independent foreign image and abolishing all the unequal treaties imposed by imperial powers.
[15] The military occupation of Taiwan was given top priority during the later phase of the civil war and constituted the primary source of hostility between China and the US when communist victory seemed inevitable.
[16] However, a significant obstacle to seizing Taiwan was the lack or absence of functional air and naval force essential to any cross-strait military operation.
A reflection of that was PLA's defeat in the Battle of Guningtou, where wooden boats of the CCP were met with well-equipped KMT armoured warships, and landing troops had to fight without air cover.
In the early stage of the negotiation, Zhu De proposed buying 100 aircraft, 100-200 helicopters 40-80 bombers, as well as training 1,000 Chinese pilots and 300 personnel at the Soviet Union.
[18] Mao also expressed his hope in Soviet air support for the planned attack on Taiwan but was rejected by Stalin for it would give the US an excuse to intervene.
[19] In his "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" published on July 1, 1949, Mao articulated the "leaning to one side" foreign policy directive, in which he framed a world divided between the confrontational Socialist and imperialist camps and that "sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.
"[20] Thus, faced with the bleak situation and threats from both within and without, consolidating the communist rule under the Cold War framework of the mid-20th century Mao saw the necessity and benefits in firmly siding with the Soviet Union and joining the socialist camp.
[22] In contrast to the Marshall Plan bearing "imperialist" and "interventionist" connotations, Soviet aid was framed as international support from the world proletariat revolutionary forces.
Mao responded euphemistically that it is necessary to consider the legality of the Yalta Conference; however, within Chinese society, the public believed that since the KMT was already defeated, the existing Treaty of Friendship and Alliance lost its purpose and significance.
The two parties agreed to adhere to the principles of "equal rights, mutual interests, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-intervention," facilitation of close cooperation, rendering economic and industrial assistance and would strive for strengthening friendship between China and the USSR.
[39][40][41] Both sides agreed on a complete transfer of all the rights and associated properties of the Changchun Railway back to China free of charge until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan but no later than 1952.
[43] The ownership of Port Dalian would be handed back to China along with the associated properties temporarily administered by the Soviet Union under a joint commission composed of representatives from both parties.
Therefore, the Soviet Union made a huge concession renouncing its vested interest in Northeast China as embodied in the return of the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalian in order to reinforce the solidarity of the socialist camp in confrontation with the capitalist bloc and the defence of the Far East.
China thus faced a trade-off between aid and revision of the independence of Outer Mongolia acknowledged in the Sino-Soviet treaty signed by the KMT government.
[53] Namely, the Soviet aid, both technical expertise and assistance in material forms such as equipment, funds, and infrastructure construction, helped lay the groundwork for China's planned economy, state-owned enterprises, and different industries.
The massive influx of Soviet aid within a short period replaced the function of capital accumulation essential to the development of economies and significantly reduced the time needed to acquire knowledge and technical skills, which often take practice and study of generations of workers to obtain.
Also, joining the Soviet-led socialist camp won China its much-needed international support, which offset the effects of economic blockade, embargo of 400 kinds of goods imposed by the capitalist bloc and military threats.
Prior to the treaty's signing, around 70% of China's industries were concentrated in the coastal area of the southeast, where trade was conducted in the 19th century between western powers and the Qing government.
There was also an institutional mismatch between the impressive capability of resources mobilization, massive industrial plant construction, and poor mechanisms of managing and coordinating production.
[57] On the one hand, the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance contributed to a fraternal relationship between the two sides and redressed the post-WWII balance of power between the capitalist and socialist camps.
The perception of Russians as benevolent "elder brothers" guiding China on the road to modernity enjoined great popularity in Chinese society and political discourse.
[59] Soviet aid to socialist countries and treaty signed with China, coinciding with American aid through the Marshall Plan and Truman's Point Four Program manifested the great power competition for spheres of influence under the cold war framework and mentality through which the Soviet Union managed to secure China's newly emerged communist regime safeguarding its interest in the Far East.