Sino-Soviet relations from 1969 to 1991
Relations between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union underwent significant change from 1969 to 1991, from open conflict to bitter détente to diplomatic partners by 1989.
The Soviets remained cautious partners with the rising CCP throughout the 22 years of the Chinese Civil War, and the USSR was the first nation to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1949.
Even after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, these two former allies remained locked in a miniature cold war, consumed by ideological, political and economic differences.
Warmer bilateral relations and mutual understanding would characterize the last two years of the Sino-Soviet relationship, up until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991.
"[1] - Gilbert RozmanThe entire Sino-Soviet relationship was a roller coaster of events, from close alliance to nuclear showdown, but by the 1980s common approaches to reform enabled the resumption of diplomatic relations and extensive trade.
Following the signing of this treaty, the USSR advanced $300 million in development loans to the PRC and sent nearly 10,000 Soviet technical advisors to work in China.
Over the next decade, extensive technological transfer and development assistance drew the two countries close together, while China firmly allied with the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
However, for the first part of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Mongolian People's Republic, a Soviet satellite since 1921, remained relatively neutral, and facilitated continued trade between the USSR and PRC.
The border conflict grew worse as each side moved more troops into the borderlands, and tensions in Moscow and Beijing rose to a breaking point.
[9] Premiers Alexei Kosygin and Zhou Enlai met at the Beijing Airport on September 11, 1969 and through a hurried series of meetings attempted to carefully negotiate a step-back from the brink of war.
Under orders from Mao, Lin Biao put the PLA strategic forces on war-readiness in full preparation for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
[12] With the nation on full alert, civilian and military authorities began to prepare for total war, under the premise that the arrival of a Soviet border negotiations team would be a ruse for an all-out nuclear strike.
[13] Sino-US rapprochement, a major break with previous foreign policies seeking to create a new balance of power in East Asia, greatly affected the Sino-Soviet relationship.
Li Danhui and Xia Yafeng argue that Mao Zedong's ideological shift toward Sino-US relations was heavily influenced by the continuing threat of the USSR.
"[15] In the midst of Sino-American reproachment in 1972, the Sino-Soviet border continued to be heavily fortified, with nearly 1 million Soviet troops, armed with tanks, airplanes, artillery and backed by ballistic missiles.
Brezhnev spoke of China's failure to accept peaceful coexistence between the two nations, while the PRC continued to view the Soviet Union as an existential threat.
[17] The death of Mao in September 1976 brought no immediate changes in the Sino-Soviet conflict, although each side had significantly reduced the number of troops stationed along the border.
Declaring that China had realized its objective of "punishing Vietnamese and Soviet hegemony," the PLA withdrew in March 1979, ending the brief third Indochina War.
The massive troop build-up along the border into the 1980s led to an imbalance of military power; the Chinese remained overwhelmed by the Soviet show of force.
For China, the instability on the northern border was increasingly seen as an unnecessary threat to the regime's existence and a thorn in the side of Chinese economic reforms.
[28]: 141 In 1981–82, Chinese fears of Soviet encirclement and a coming war diminished; however, the desire to remove these threats remained the top priority for normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.
"[29] Deng reacted immediately, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded saying "We paid attention to the sections concerning Sino-Soviet relations in President Brezhnev’s speech in Tashkent on March 24.
At the same time, both sides should work on finding mutually acceptable measures in order to solve the problem of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia.
"[30] - Yu HongliangThe PRC remained focused on overcoming the "three major obstacles" for diplomatic relations, but this note added flexibility, recognizing that these issues could be solved over time.
Further warming occurred with the writing of the 1982 PRC Constitution, which removed references to "social imperialism" and "contemporary revisionism" which had been inserted during the height of the Sino-Soviet split.
[33] Despite progress in cultural and political ties from greater trade to ping-pong competitions, neither nation was willing to compromise on the balance of military power in Asia.
[34] In the winter of 1984–1985, the first Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Ivan Arkhipov, traveled to Beijing and, at a state banquet, it was announced that China recognized the Soviet Union as a fellow socialist country.
In March 1985, while in Moscow for Konstantin Chernenko's funeral, Li Peng met with the new Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, with both sides explicitly stating their desire to normalize all relations.
At the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the beginnings of perestroika in the USSR, radically reforming and restructuring the stagnant Soviet economy.
[38] With Gorbachev's concessions on troops, the Chinese also stepped back agreeing that the "three major obstacles" could be resolved simultaneously to negotiations for full diplomatic normalization of relations.
