Slap of Tunis

[2] However, they relied on a possible British opposition to an enlargement of the French sphere of influence in North Africa (while, if anything, London was hostile about a single country controlling the whole Strait of Sicily).

Ferry confirmed that it was Otto von Bismarck to invite Paris to act in Tunisia precising that, in case of action, Germany wouldn't have raised objections.

The events, in effect, demonstrated the unrealistic nature of the foreign policy of Cairoli and of Depretis, the impossibility of an alliance with France and the necessity of a rapprochement with Berlin and with Vienna, even if obtorto collo.

However, such an inversion of the foreign policy of the last decade, couldn't be led by the same men, and Cairoli resigned from office on 29 May 1881, thus avoiding that the Camera[clarification needed] would openly distrust him; since then he de facto disappeared from the political scene.

The bey's weakness, the intrigues of the ministers, like Mustapha Khaznadar and Mustapha Ben Ismaïl, constant pressure from European consuls, the bankruptcy of the state, become hostage of the creditors despite the effort of the reformer Hayreddin Pasha, opened doors to French occupation (hoped by German chancellor Otto von Bismarck to attract French attentions on the Mediterranean, and distract them from the Franco-German border).

In the end, Europeans and Tunisians were equally represented (53 members for each community) in the Grand Council, a consultative assembly elected by universal suffrage with a double-turn system.

The European powers reacted differently depending on their interests: the United Kingdom hurried to occupy Egypt, while Germany and Austria-Hungary didn't express dissent about the French behaviour.