For this reason, the Smyth Report focused heavily on information, such as basic nuclear physics, which was either already widely known in the scientific community or easily deducible by a competent scientist, and omitted details about chemistry, metallurgy, and ordnance.

The Smyth Report sold almost 127,000 copies in its first eight printings, and was on The New York Times best-seller list from mid-October 1945 until late January 1946.

[4] In early 1944, Smyth raised the possibility of producing an unclassified report for the general public on the achievements of the Manhattan Project.

He arranged a meeting with James B. Conant, the President of Harvard University and one of the senior administrators of the Manhattan Project, who had similar thoughts.

Both the report and the choice of Smyth as its author were approved by the Manhattan Project's governing body, the Military Policy Committee, in May 1944.

For this reason, the Smyth Report focused heavily on information already available in declassified literature, such as much of the basic nuclear physics used in weapons, which was either already widely known in the scientific community or could have been easily deduced by a competent scientist.

The present report is written for this professional group and is a matter-of-fact, general account of work in the USA since 1939 aimed at the production of such bombs.

[7] This contrasted somewhat with what Groves wrote in the foreword:[8]All pertinent scientific information which can be released to the public at this time without violating the needs of national security is contained in this volume.

People disclosing or securing additional information by any means whatsoever without authorization are subject to severe penalties under the Espionage Act.

[9] Smyth possessed security clearances necessary to visit project sites, access documents and to discuss the work with the research personnel.

A letter to the Manhattan Project's senior managers, Kenneth Nichols, Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, Harold Urey, and Franklin Matthias, explained:The purpose is to give clearly and promptly recognition to those who have worked so long and necessarily so anonymously ... To accomplish his purpose, Dr. Smyth must have rather complete information concerning your phase of the project including access to necessary documents ... [and] information and advice from you and your principal assistants.

(A) That it has no real bearing on the production of atomic bombs or (B) That it could be discovered by a small group (15 of whom not over 5 would be senior men) of competent scientists working in a well-equipped college lab in a year's time or less.

[18] To prepare the final draft for the printer, Groves brought typists with the required security clearances to Washington, D.C., from the Manhattan District's headquarters in Oak Ridge.

[14] Because the Manhattan Project was an Allied endeavor, Groves had to obtain permission from the British and American governments to publish the Smyth Report.

[19] The meeting went on for two hours, as Groves and Conant sought to reassure Stimson that the report would not give vital secrets away to the Soviet Union.

"[19] A thousand copies of the report were printed by lithography at the Pentagon,[20] and deposited in Groves's office in the New War Department Building in Washington, D.C., where they were kept securely locked away.

[21] Final approval was sought from the President, Harry S. Truman, in a meeting at the White House on August 9, 1945, three days after the bombing of Hiroshima.

Stimson, Harrison, Groves, Conant, Vannevar Bush, and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy presented their views, and Truman authorized the immediate release of the report.

[23] Groves was concerned about the security implications of the title, so instead of having "Atomic Bombs" on the cover, it was left blank, and a rubber stamp was made.

He found it much easier to imagine delays due to unexpected printing problems, and his workers returning from summer vacation to find themselves locked out of a plant filled with top secret material.

[26] Princeton University Press received a copy of the typescript lithograph edition with hand corrections from Smyth on August 17, 1945.

The presses were held for three hours while the train made its way to a siding in York, where the paper was unloaded and brought to the printing plant by trucks.

In response to public concerns about radioactivity, Groves had text added to paragraph 12.18 explaining how the height of the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki reduced fallout and allowed fission products to be drawn up into the upper atmosphere.

According to Schwartz, postwar histories and popular writing tended to follow the Smyth Report in this regard, creating a lasting historiographical legacy.

[37][38] The Smyth Report, wrote Robert P. Crease, "more than any other single document made E = mc2 an emblem of atomic energy and weaponry.

"[38] Groves felt that: on the whole, and considering the rather difficult conditions under which it was prepared, the Smyth Report was extraordinarily successful in its efforts to distribute credit fairly and accurately.

And there can be no question that it excellently served its purpose as an essential source of accurate information, particularly for a news-hungry America in the early days after Nagasaki.

[43] The deletion between the original text and the Princeton version concerning the poisoning effect was soon noticed by the Russian translators, and only served to highlight its importance to the Soviet project.

[44][45][46] As pioneering French nuclear weapons scientist Bertrand Goldschmidt later said, The details revealed in the Smyth report were invaluable for any country launching into atomic work; for nothing is more important, when undertaking technical research over a wide field than knowing in advance which lines of approach can or cannot lead to success, even if this knowledge relates only to basic principles.

[48] Not everyone would agree: in 1947, United States Atomic Energy Commission member Lewis Strauss would call publication of the Smyth Report "a serious breach of security";[49] and in late 1952, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower would say the Smyth Report had given away too much information, including the exact locations of the atomic materials production plants.