A situation further complicated by the emergence of Marxist guerrillas, including the notorious Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña and Boricua Popular Army, within the pre-existing independence movement in Puerto Rico.
Ultimately, the status issue stagnated throughout the remainder of the Cold War, but the pro-sovereignty efforts undertaken during this time frame eventually led to the current incarnation of the free association movement in Puerto Rico.
[14] Fernós argued that the Commonwealth realm relationship between Canada and the United Kingdom surpassed a simple form of autonomy, instead being a kind of association superior to any status that would keep the sovereignty of Puerto Rico in the hands of Congress.
[17] The following year, Fernós analyzed the complications of directly transitioning from the colonial economic model established by the United States and listed what he considered could be possible steps for a prosperous sovereignty.
[19] Fernós, who thought that the socio-economic issues should be attended first, was largely responsible for drafting the respective part of the party's program, being joined by Vicente Géigel Polanco and Rafael Arjona Siaca.
[21] In 1945, Muñoz led a local Commission that later became involved in the process to create a third option that fell between independence and statehood, the similarly defined "Dominion" status authored by Vicente Géigel Polanco.
[16] In 1946, Fernós noted that as part of the ongoing process, Congress had to openly express its willingness to renounce the sovereignty of Puerto Rico that it had acquired through the Treaty of Paris, thus allowing the archipelago to create a proper self-government.
[25] The Estado Libre Asociado as conceived by Fernós was focused on the internationalization of Puerto Rico rather that its growth within the limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States, as exposed in an article published by him on July 2, 1946, where he discussed the type of relation that should be established with the rest of the world.
[26] That same year, Fernós was elected Resident Commissioner for the PPD and began promoting that Puerto Rico reclaimed its sovereignty from the United States Congress, while also conserving an economic link between both.
[34] Fernós firmly supported these initiatives, believing that it was instrumental towards establishing a sovereign constitution in the near future and played a key role in its approval, turning Puerto Rico into the first territory to democratically elect a governor.
[35] While remaining Muñoz's main contact in Washington, Fernós also developed an interest in the process that created an Organic Act for Guam, a long-standing military possession with parallels to his own case.
[41] Fernós continued his pursuit of sovereignty by pursuing the creation of a local Constitution that was completely redacted, lacking "colonial vestiges" including unwanted Federal Laws, unmodified and presented by democratically elected representatives of the Puerto Rican people, with the support of the popular vote.
[48] Shortly afterwards, Fernós appeared in a radio broadcast explaining his proposal, claiming that full independence was not possible at the moment due to opposition in Congress and that statehood would be impossible for a prolonged time period.
[51] The 1948 general elections took on a plebiscitary approach and saw Muñoz Marín support Fernós' proposal to pursue a relation similar to the Commonwealth realms, although, he noted that it should only serve as a transition for independence or incorporation.
[23] However, taking inspiration on Thomas Jefferson's Northwest Ordinance, the party's president also wished to launch a project containing disposition and articles in the nature of a "compact", "forever to remain unalterable unless by common interest", a language that he added to Fernós's proposal.
[65] In June 1946, Muñoz published an article titled "Nuevos caminos hacia viejos objetivos", which redefined his concepts of "liberty" and "sovereignty", the later of which he defined as "an union of forces that produce the real power [required] to execute the people's will".
[80] This initiative intended to replace the Federal Relation Statute of Public Law 600 with a series of "association articles" and requested Congress to make it clear that Puerto Rico was no longer a territory or possession of the United States.
[95] This was a reactive measure taken only six days after Prime Minister of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev and President of Cuba Fidel Castro denounced that Puerto Rico remained a territory before the General Assembly of the UN.
[98] The development of the status now fell on an executive order that would explain the Kennedy administration's position on the Commonwealth equivalent to a "memorandum of understanding" and which would move Puerto Rico's case away from the DOI.
[101] However, this campaign did no go as expected, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State did not support the notion that the Commonwealth could be an "inalterable pact" that could only be modified by mutual consent, recognizing the fact that Congress -as the holder of Puerto Rico's sovereignty- was capable of doing so unilaterally.
[105] This concept, known then as the "culminated" or "perfected Estado Libre Asociado" was consistent with the definition of free association approved by the United Nations on December 14, 1960, through UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV).
[107] The United States Department of Defense became involved, requesting that even if Puerto Rico acquired the sovereignty desired, the military was to retain the capability of expropriating terrains that they considered strategic granted by the pre-existing eminent domain.
[121] This sudden decision had more side effects in Congress, where several legislators began questioning both the action that enabled Public Law 600 and a move towards association, which was called "sweetened independence" by opposers.
[122] Shortly afterwards, Muñoz took a sudden reactionary decision to qualm the claims of independence and reconsidered the term "permanent union" and the proposal supporting presidential vote, adding them the project despite the direct contradiction between these and any form of sovereign association.
[128] After the project went to public hearings, Hiram Torres Rigual and Juan Manuel García Passalacqua presented Muñoz with an analysis of the deponent arguments which focused on the recognition of the sovereignty and the opposition to the presidential vote.
[137] Muñoz reunited with all Puerto Rican members of the informal Commission and developed a strategy known as Operación ELA, which attended all sorts of concerns that had appeared among Congressmen, from several inmovilistic arguments to the farfetched the possibility of "a communist advance".
[141] In February 1963, members of Operación ELA held another reunion and the document that emerged from it applied the modifications proposed by the statehood movement but retained Fernós' postures regarding sovereignty and association.
[144] At the urgency of US Rep. Leo W. O'Brien, a member of the United States House Committee on Insular Affairs, who suggested it as a strategy to "facilitate" the approval of the project, Muñoz and Fernós had decided to temporarily put aside the demand of sovereignty.
[151] While the faction clashed directly with the older members of the party, Muñoz was open to their proposals, including some in his final speech as governor titled El proposito de Puerto Rico (lit.
[153] The project failed to provide any significant advances towards the resolution of the status of Puerto Rico and during the following years, the only notable action taken would be a non-binding referendum that did not produce any long-term reaction from Congress.