Spa Conference (13–15 August 1918)
This conference was significant as it marked a shift in the Central Powers' approach, with civil officials beginning to recognize the improbability of a military victory.
This situation, coupled with the massive arrival of American troops reinforcing the Entente forces, led the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy to seriously consider the prospect of a compromise peace.
Each month, since the spring, the Imperial Army experienced the loss of approximately 80,000 soldiers, after accounting for the new recruits and subtracting those who were wounded, killed, or ill.[11][10] In response to these challenges, the German command decided to shift its strategic approach, reverting to a defensive strategy that had been prevalent before the start of 1918.
[N 6] Despite this admission, Ludendorff concealed the extent of the failure from Emperor Wilhelm II, who continued to advocate for the cessation of hostilities and the initiation of negotiations with the Allies.
[15][16][17][18] Ludendorff sought to mitigate public alarm about the dire military situation by presenting a revised strategy of defense aimed at gradually undermining the enemy's will to fight.
[24] On 14 August 1918, Emperor-King Charles I of Austria arrived in Spa, accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stephan Burián von Rajecz.
[20] From the outset, Emperor-King Charles I of Austria-Hungary, supported by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced the impossibility of the dual monarchy continuing to endure a fifth winter of war.
[25][26][17] During the Crown Council held on 13 and 14 August, Paul von Hindenburg asserted that German forces could maintain their occupation of significant portions of French territory.
Paul von Hintze proposed retaining German troops in Belgium as a bargaining chip, to be evacuated in exchange for the restitution of Germany's colonies upon the signing of a peace treaty.
Additionally, discussions touched on the future of Poland, including the restoration of the Polish crown and the distribution of the kingdom's industrial assets.
[27][6] During the discussions between military leaders, the German and Austro-Hungarian generals presented their respective operational plans, which were the subject of intense negotiation.
The Austro-Hungarians aimed to launch a new offensive with Genoa as the final objective, while the German representatives emphasized the need to support the French front.
This initiative was to be managed by a "propaganda committee" composed of prominent figures, tasked with projecting the German Empire's determination to continue fighting until achieving victory.
One of the first actions of this committee occurred on 21 August 1918, when Paul von Hintze sought to address the concerns of the political leaders in the Reichstag.
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Stephan Burián advocated for an "immediate and direct" resolution, but he returned to Vienna with the understanding that the Germans were attempting to buy time.
[7][12][27] On 21 August, with support from Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Stephan Burián sent the proposed text of a peace offer to Berlin.
