Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the assertion that attempted monopolization may be proven merely by demonstration of unfair or predatory conduct.

[3] Rather, the legislative history indicates that much of the interpretation of the necessarily broad principles of the Act was to be left for the courts in particular cases.

[4] When in 1905 the Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of attempt to monopolize under § 2, it wrote as follows: Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent—for instance, the monopoly—but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen.

[5]The Court went on to explain, however, that not every act done with intent to produce an unlawful result constitutes an attempt.

[6] "Swift thus indicated that intent is necessary, but alone is not sufficient, to establish the dangerous probability of success that is the object of § 2's prohibition of attempts.

"[7] "The Court's decisions since Swift have reflected the view that the plaintiff charging attempted monopolization must prove a dangerous probability of actual monopolization, which has generally required a definition of the relevant market and examination of market power.

It is generally required that to demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove: "In order to determine whether there is a dangerous probability of monopolization, courts have found it necessary to consider the relevant market and the defendant's ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market.