Stalin's Missed Chance covers a theory of planned Soviet invasion raised by Viktor Suvorov, author of highly controversial books such as Icebreaker.
Contrary to many Western scholars (David Glantz, John D. Erickson, Richard Overy and others), Mikhail Meltyukhov concurs with Suvorov's claim that Stalin and the Soviet military leadership had planned an offensive against Germany in 1941.
Stalin's Missed Chance is an extensive study of archive sources, often quoting and summarizing wartime records of the Red Army and the Soviet Union.
Thus, "the USSR succeeded in staying out of the European war, after obtaining in this case a significant free hand in Eastern Europe, wider space to maneuver in its own interests between the belligerent sides.
'"[3] As for the Soviet-German relationship during 1940, Meltyukhov points out that, although both sides had the common goal of weakening Britain and negotiations were held in November 1940, a military alliance was never realised.
Thus, the author thinks that the idea that the Red Army must strike first (clearly formulated in Zhukov's plan from May 15, 1941) was in a concealed form already present in all the previous drafts.
[11] This fact and the absence of a connection between a possible strike by the enemy and the actions of the Red Army makes the suggestion of a 'counter-strike strategy' very implausible to Meltyukhov.
The overall Soviet superiority in aviation would have made it possible to subject German airfields in a 250 km-deep border zone to continuous airstrikes, which would have led to a significant weakening of the enemy and would have facilitated Red Army ground forces operations.
[14] The basic idea of Soviet military planning consisted in the fact that the Red Army was to concentrate near the border under the disguise of maneuvers and to go over into a sudden, decisive attack.
"The absence of any references to the possible defensive operations of the Red Army shows that the discussion was not about the preparation for a pre-emptive strike but for the assault on Germany and its allies.
[15] The basis for this assumption is revealed by Molotov's recollection 40 years later in a conversation with Russian journalist Ivan Stadnyuk: "I don't remember all the motives for cancelling this decision, but it seems to me that Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess' flight to England played the main role there.
The NKVD reconnaissance reported to us, that Hess on behalf of Hitler had proposed the United Kingdom to conclude peace and to participate in the military march against the USSR...
With regards to the failure of the Soviet leadership to comprehend the German threat, Stalin hadn’t believed Hitler was going to invade and risk war on two fronts.
[20] The remaining troops were in motion and the Luftwaffe had completed re-dislocation after the Balkan campaign, but the "Wehrmacht had neither defensive nor offensive groups [yet], and a Soviet attack at this moment would have placed it in a very complicated position and made it possible [for the Red Army] to tear its forces apart.
In a telegram to President Franklin D. Roosevelt from June 15, 1941, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill suggested providing the Soviets with every possible assistance in case a war between Germany and the USSR broke out.
[27] Similarly, Russian émigré historian Constantine Pleshakov, who is supportive of the Soviet planned offensive theory, has drawn from Stalin's Missed Chance (as from books by V. Nevezhin and V. Danilov) in his recent study.