The original role was for a light, fast ship intended to break up attacks by British fast-cruiser forces that might attempt bombardment of Russia's northern ports.

The design was reimagined in 1944, intended to operate along with the Sverdlov-class cruisers and proposed aircraft carriers to make up powerful task forces able to challenge the American fleet.

However, the designers recommended an increase in the main armament caliber to 220 millimeters (8.7 in), a strengthened anti-aircraft battery and reductions in the armor protection, speed, and range.

[2] A new tactical requirement was issued in November 1944 that envisioned a more realistic displacement of 25,000–26,000 tonnes (25,000–26,000 long tons) while the speed was dropped to 33 knots (61 km/h; 38 mph) and the range to 8,000 nmi (15,000 km; 9,200 mi).

[2] Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov believed that these ships could protect the planned Soviet aircraft carriers in bad weather from American cruisers and pushed to have them built, but the Shipbuilding Commissariat balked.

This was based on defensive operations along the periphery of the Soviet Union against Anglo-American carrier groups while submarines would attack their lines of communication.

When the program was discussed by the Politburo on 29 September 1945 there was no great disagreement on the large cruisers, although Stalin favored increasing the size of their main guns to 305 mm (12.0 in), but did not push the issue when Admiral Kuznetsov resisted.

To resolve the dispute a special commission was appointed, led by Lavrentiy Beria, which mostly sided with the Shipbuilding Commissariat in that most ships of the program would be improved versions of current designs.

The joint design was 2,000 tonnes (2,000 long tons) smaller with a reduced secondary armament, but was about 1.5 knots (2.8 km/h; 1.7 mph) faster.

However, when Stalin reviewed the sketch design in September 1949, he rejected it, ordering a smaller, faster ship capable of 35 knots (65 km/h; 40 mph).

TsKB-17 was able to produce a preliminary technical design that met Stalin's demands by the end of the year, an amazingly fast amount of time for what should have been a very involved process.

The most likely explanation is that the designers retained as much of their original work as possible and found room for the more powerful turbines and more numerous boilers necessary to attain Stalin's specified speed by deleting the two rear twin 130 mm turrets, and their magazines, as revealed by a comparison of the 1949 and 1951 sketches.

"You cannot blindly copy the Americans and English, they face different conditions, their ships travel far over the ocean, out of touch with their bases.

"[6] The admirals also did not like the reduction in the secondary armament made to accommodate the larger machinery and extra boilers needed to reach the speed desired by Stalin, but he reminded them that most aircraft would attack the battlecruiser at heights below 1,500 m (4,900 ft) and the ceiling of the 130 mm was far in excess of that.

The original form of the bow was similar to that of the Chapayev-class light cruisers, but sea trials of the lead ship of that class in December 1950 – January 1951 proved that she was very wet forward, which hindered her seakeeping ability.

The Stalingrad's bow form was radically altered with a much more raked stem, its sheer and flare were greatly increased and the ship gained almost 10 m (32 ft 10 in) in length, possibly in response to the Chapayev's problems.

The ships had a triple bottom underneath the armored citadel that had a height of 2.25 meters (7 ft 5 in) and 23 main watertight compartments.

[10] The high speed demanded of the Stalingrads required four TV-4 geared steam turbines, each producing 70,000 shaft horsepower (52,199 kW) and driving one propeller.

5,000 tonnes (4,900 long tons) of fuel oil were carried which gave a range of 5,000 nmi (9,300 km; 5,800 mi) at 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph).

[11] The waterline belt armor was 180 mm (7.1 in) thick and inclined outwards at an angle of 15° to maximize its effectiveness against both plunging and horizontal fire.

The waterline forward of the citadel was protected by a 50-millimeter (2.0 in) splinter belt all the way to the bow, with a similar extension aft to the steering gear compartment.

The main surface-search radar was Rif-A (NATO designation Ball End) that had a range of 40 km (25 mi) against surface targets.

The ballistic missiles would have been launched from vertical tubes replacing the forward turrets, and in one version, the entire main armament.

[18] The first sections of Stalingrad had been laid down in November 1951 in Slipway "O" of the Marti South Shipyard in Nikolayev where a Sovetsky Soyuz-class battleship, Sovetskaya Ukraina, had begun construction in 1938,[19] but the slipway itself was in need of reconstruction and its lower end was occupied by the hull of the Sverdlov-class light cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov which was scheduled for launch at the end of 1952.

The unnamed third ship was laid down at Yard 402, at Molotovsk around October 1952, Soviet sources refer to her proposed names as Kronshtadt or Arkhangelsk.

But deliveries of steel, armor, machinery and other equipment were delayed or arrived out of sequence, despite extraordinary efforts by the Ministry of Shipbuilding, and slowed construction enough so that she fell about six months behind schedule and the same was more or less true for the other ships.

Her hull was launched on 16 April 1954 and her stern, which was more or less complete, was dismantled—her bow hadn't been built when work was suspended a year earlier—and the central, 150-meter (490 ft) long, section was modified for her new role.

[22] Stalingrad's hull was towed from Nikolayev on 19 May 1955 by three tugs, but was driven ashore by high winds on 23 May at the southern entrance to Sevastopol Bay.

At this time a more detailed assessment was made of the situation and 259 steel projections were discovered on the underside of her hull, left over from her launching cradles.

[23] The capsizing of the battleship Novorossiysk in Sevastopol harbor on 29 October 1955 delayed salvage operations on Stalingrad until the end of the year.