Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment,[1] was a decision of the High Court of Australia concerning the "anti-circumvention" provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

Sony argued that Stevens had knowingly sold or distributed a "circumvention device" which was capable of circumventing a "technological protection measure", contrary to s 116A of the Copyright Act.

Sony alleged that Steven's 'mod chips' circumvented a measure that protected the applicants' copyright in literary works (computer programs) and cinematograph films.

The ACCC thought that Sony's RAC process interfered with imported lawfully sold copyright material in Australia by blocking the use of games purchased from different regional codes.

At first instance in the Federal Court of Australia,[2] Sackville J held that Sony's RAC system did not fall within the meaning of a TPM as contained in s 10(1) of the Act.

Sackville J focused his attention on the opening words of the definition, and held that Sony's "device" was not, as such, in the ordinary course of its operation, designed "to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright".

Sackville J reasoned that Sony's RAC system "merely [had] a general deterrent or discouraging effect on those who might be contemplating infringing copyright... for example, by making unlawful copies of a CD-ROM".

Sony submitted that its device (comprising either or both the PlayStation Boot ROM and access code) constituted a TPM on three distinct bases, all of which come within the construction of the language in the Copyright Act.

The High Court further found that protective devices like the PlayStation Boot ROM and access code are not "designed… to prevent… the infringement of copyright", as they do not render the user unable to "reproduce the work in material form".

The High Court declined Sony's argument, siding with Stevens- who relied on the precedent of Emmet J's decision in Australian Video Retailers Association v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd.[8] In which Emmet J ruled, in relation to the RAM of a DVD Player, that: “… In ordinary form, temporary storage of a substantial part of the computer program in the RAM of a DVD Player will not involve a reproduction of the computer program in a material form".

Sackville J in the initial hearing found that only a very small proportion of the images and sounds comprising the cinematograph film were "embodied" in the PlayStation console's RAM at any given time.

[1]: at para 156  The majority of the High Court held “ At no point in the process through which the game code is downloaded into the RAM and eventually transmitted to the television is a "cinematograph film" copied into any of the PlayStation console's articles or things".

Chief Justice Gleeson in The High Court stated; "Over a long period amendments to copyright law have comprised legislative solutions to problems created by competing economic and social pressures associated with the development of new technologies.

[11] Dellit & Kendall imply that possibly a 'state of panic' over computer games piracy lead to the increased restrictions of the Digital Agenda Act.

This delicate balance is reflected in Gleeson CJ's statement referred to above, that “…The task of this Court … is to construe the particular compromises …”[1]: at paras 2–6 Kenyon & Wright suggest that the effect of this case may spread out to decisions regarding media regulation.

The major issue in Australia of the treatment of TPMs and their circumvention under copyright law could possibly re-emerge in decisions about media regulation – as illustrated in the proposal for content protection.