String of Pearls (Indian Ocean)
The emergence of the String of Pearls is indicative of China's growing geopolitical influence through concerted efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, expand and modernise military forces, and foster stronger diplomatic relationships with trading partners.
[12] Chinese Communist Party general secretaries Hu Jintao[12] and Xi Jinping[13] have both asserted that China will never seek hegemony in foreign relations.
[17] In 2004, the U.S. consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton came up with the "string of pearls" hypothesis, which posits that China will try to expand its naval presence by building civilian maritime infrastructure along the Indian Ocean periphery.
The sea lines of communication that link the Chinese mainland with ports throughout the Middle East and coasts of Africa have become a major source of conflict with respect to China's energy security.
[19] The oversea transport of oil from existing production areas will continue to remain the primary mode of energy importation for the foreseeable future.
Efforts to secure new supply lines in Central Asia have proven difficult, with poor infrastructure, political instability, logistical challenges, and corruption hampering energy development there.
The central government's efforts to exercise greater control in the region began in earnest after the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines in 1991.
For the Chinese central government, which has funded the majority of the $1.2 billion construction, Gwadar represents an important strategic foothold situated only 240 miles from the Strait of Hormuz.
Furthermore, given Bangladesh's close economic ties to India, and agreements for the expansion of Indian investment in Bangladeshi infrastructure projects, Chittagong's military significance for the Chinese is exaggerated.
[29] China as a part of BRI is planning to construct deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, on Myanmar's west coast which is 970 km from India's Andaman and Nicobar islands, at an estimated cost of $7 billion.
[30][31] China has also agreed to finance and build a $10 billion port in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, which is expected to be completed in 2017 and handle 20 million shipping containers annually.
Furthermore, the doctrine makes explicit mention of the need to police international shipping lanes and control choke points of Indian Ocean trade in particular.
[27] In 2007, India opened its second overseas military listening post in northern Madagascar, with the aim of better overseeing shipping movements through the Mozambique Channel.
The construction of the Sittwe port is often cited as evidence of a concerted strategy on the part of India to counterbalance growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
A number of these counter-terrorism and anti-piracy efforts have been conducted in co-ordination with American forces, though Indian officials have traditionally restricted joint military exercises to common interest initiatives, often those under UN sanction.
[40] Nevertheless, renewed US interest in countering the threat of Islamic terrorism in South Asia has pushed India and the United States towards more substantive military co-operation.
Efforts for bilateral co-operation against rising Chinese power are bolstered by popular fears that China's expanded presence in the Indian Ocean threatens India's economic and military security.
Further, a strategy known as 'Necklace of Diamonds' is being applied to counter Chinese growing influence and its contentious territorial, diplomatic or commercial issues in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and with ASEAN nations.
India strengthens ties with Vietnam, Oman, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, Singapore, Seychelles and all five Central Asian Republics to conduct joint army, airforce and naval exercises (see also China Rim).
[43][44] The US Navy has unparalleled power projection capabilities and operational strength, and is the major naval force in the waters of South and Southeast Asia.
This approach has emphasised multilateralism, as exemplified by increased US engagement with ASEAN and efforts for the formation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a pan-Asian free trade deal.
[19] Strong US relations with its key regional allies, including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, have been reinforced by strengthened co-operation with countries threatened by Chinese control, such as the Philippines.
[39] Japanese apprehensions regarding the development of an interconnected system of Chinese military and commercial ports centers primarily on the protection of trading interests.
Both island groups are located off of China's eastern seaboard and must be navigated by Chinese naval and commercial vessels sailing on their way to the wider Pacific Ocean.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's has described this new China-wary foreign policy as having the potential to create an "arc of freedom" between Japan and its traditional allies the US and Australia, and India.
