Both the planned Anglo-French support of Finland in the Winter War, and the following German occupation of Denmark and Norway during Operation Weserübung were to a large extent motivated by the wish to deny their respective enemies iron critical for wartime production of steel.
[4] Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, was particularly concerned about Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany, and pushed for the British government to take military action to end the trade.
Germany, had limited natural resources and was reliant on large scale imports for a wide range of goods and raw materials, including iron ore, a steady supply of which was imperative in the creation of steel to sustain its war effort and general economy.
[citation needed] While the Allies were keen to maintain the moral high ground and stressed at every opportunity the difference in impact between their approach compared to their enemy's, they were mindful that many neutral mariners (including those of Sweden) relied upon the trade with Nazi Germany for their livelihoods, and so during the opening stages of the war they were careful not to be too strict with non-combatant vessels for fear the blockade would alienate neutral nations into joining the war on the side of Germany.
But the stormy Atlantic coast of Norway also provided another extremely useful geological feature for Germany in its attempts to continue shipping the ore and beating the allied blockade.
Immediately offshore from Norway's western coast lies the Skjaergaard (Skjærgård), a continuous chain of some 50,000 glacially formed skerries (small uninhabited islands) sea stacks and rocks running parallel to the shore.
A partially hidden sea lane (which Churchill called the Norwegian Corridor) exists in the area between this rocky fringe and the coastal landmass proper.
In the winter of 1939–1940 a steady stream of their specially-constructed iron ore vessels made the long trip south from Narvik, sometimes within the three-mile curtilage of neutral Norwegian territorial waters, sometimes just outside if the way appeared hazardous or the sea particularly turbulent.
No other measure is open to us for many months to come which gives so good a chance of abridging the waste and destruction of the conflict, or of perhaps preventing the vast slaughters which will attend the grapple of the main armies.
At the time it was seen as an early indication that Britain was at last taking steps to end the iron trade and over the next few days several other German ships were sunk at the entrance to the Baltic.
Following reports that strong British destroyer and submarine forces were stationed in the Skagerrak, Berlin ordered all her ships along the iron ore route to port immediately.
The British and French made attempts to assist the Norwegians, landing considerable forces at Narvik on 14 April and fighting fierce naval engagements off the coast.
There was an attempt to blow up this bridge on 14 April, but lack of expertise and of explosives meant that the damages were not so large and it was repaired fairly quickly and was used for ore transport throughout the war.
[9] To avoid mass firing as iron ore production declined during the war LKAB workers were kept busy extracting waste rock and some were allowed to retire with pensions before schedule.
This allowed Sweden to continue to provide Germany with ball-bearing steel, largely offsetting the drop in the Swedish export of finished ball bearings.
After the tide of battle on the eastern front had irreversibly shifted following German defeats at El Alemein, Stalingrad and Kursk in the winter and summer of 1943, the Soviet Union, at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943, took the lead in suggesting a more active role for Sweden in the War, such as by allowing the establishment of Allied air bases in its territory.
The ongoing diplomatic pressure, together with the deteriorating German military position gradually persuaded Sweden to reduce and ultimately end its trade with Germany by November 1944.