The Captain said "OK" and, believing he had sufficient runway available, retarded the thrust levers and aborted the takeoff just six seconds after rotation.

He applied full reverse thrust and maximum braking and the airplane began to decelerate, but not as fast as he had expected.

Although only three of eight exit doors were available for use, the evacuation was completed within two minutes, and the airport rescue and fire fighting teams' response was timely and adequate.

In addition, two L-1011s had experienced engine fires in the past two years, the first at Boston in 1990, and the second occurring three months earlier at JFK.

[6] The NTSB attributed the crash to Human Factors (Crew Resource Management) and TWA training, procedural, maintenance and Quality Assurance failures.

The Angle of Attack sensor that had caused the erroneous stall warning had been found unserviceable on nine previous occasions, had received some checks and was then put back into the parts pool and fitted to the accident aircraft.

[1] According to the report, the First Officer handed over control to the Captain shortly after take-off at an altitude of 14 feet (4.3 m) without a clear transfer of command, due to the erroneous activation of the stick shaker stall warning device.

"[1]: 65 It goes on to say: "The Captain made a split second decision to abort the takeoff believing that there was sufficient runway remaining.

"[1]: 66  The extremely hard landing caused damage to the right wing, spilling fuel that was then ingested into the engines and started the fire.

At the same time however, the NTSB also criticized the flight crew for deciding to abort the takeoff after VR and their response to the stick-shaker activation, both of which were inappropriate.