[1] One of the reasons for this was to diminish the power of the Ustajlu tribe, who held the territories of present-day southern Georgia and Armenia, although another motive was plunder.

[2] During Shah Tahmasp's initial march, Tbilisi was plundered, its churches, Georgian nobles' wealth, children, and wives were seized as booty.

[8] In subsequent campaigns, Shah Tahmasp did not personally participate; instead, the representation of Qizilbash rule in the region was entrusted to Shahverdi Sultan Ziyadoghlu Qajar.

[6] The conversion of these Georgian princes to Shiism did not hinder Kartli rulers like Luarsab I and his son Simon from continuing their resistance against the Qizilbash, who were attempting to regain Tbilisi.

The lack of political and military unity in the fragmented Georgian kingdoms made them easy targets for the larger and more organized armies of the Ottomans and Safavids.

However, the religious and political confrontation between the two empires in border territories did not diminish in importance; military operations in the region were often necessary to showcase imperial power and strengthen their claims of legitimacy.

Furthermore, during this period, the Safavid state was highly militarized, and warfare was considered a natural and noble way of life for the Qizilbash warriors who fulfilled these duties.

Tahmasp appointed his commanders who participated in these campaigns to key state positions, and they, in turn, distributed the spoils of war among their supporters.

All these factors served as strong motivations for expansion into the Caucasus, and the Safavid high command believed that these benefits outweighed the direct confrontation risk with the Ottomans in the region.

On the other hand, the Principality of Samtskhe, taking advantage of its geographical distance to avoid the risks of direct military confrontation and maintain its independence, engaged in political dialogue with the Safavids.

He was a staunch adversary of Shah Tahmasp during this period and vigorously resisted the Safavids' attempts to establish dominance in Kartli and neighboring regions.

Hasan-bey Rumlu, in his chronicle, writes: "In defense of the faith and the victory of Shah Islam and the strengthening of the Prophet's religion, fearless armies marched to Georgia."

Just two years prior to the Safavid invasion, Michel Membray, the Venetian envoy who passed through Georgia, wrote: According to his (King Luarsab's) nobles, he has approximately 5,000 cavalrymen called aznavurs...

Hasan bey Rumlu, who participated in Shah Tahmasp's first campaign to Georgia, provides more detailed information compared to other available sources.

[15] Capturing the fortress was essential to break the power of Georgian armed forces in any specific area and played a significant role in these campaigns.

Correspondingly, this victory brought great personal benefits to Shah Tahmasp himself, as it reflected the increasing power and influence of his armed forces.

Ultimately, the success achieved in this campaign led to an increase in loyalty of the Qizilbash commanders to their Shahs and convinced them of his strong leadership.

Apparently, the decision was influenced by the rebellion of Shah Tahmasp's younger brother, Alqas Mirza, and his participation in the third Ottoman campaign.

The Shah accepted the offer and dispatched his senior officials, Shahqulu Khalifeh Mohuradari, Sevindik Bey Qorchubashi, and Badr Khan Ustajlu, to arrange for Alqas Mirza to swear an oath on the Quran that he would not rebel again.

Realizing that he could not defeat the Qizilbash, Alqas Mirza fled the battlefield and sought refuge in Ottoman territories, deciding to seek asylum with Sultan Suleyman.

[18] Since Alqas Mirza showed the initial signs of submission, the main army of the Qizilbash was stationed in the city of Tabriz and was fully prepared for battle.

After Alqas declared his submission and swore to pay taxes and send troops, a decision was made to attack Kaxetiya with the army already in readiness in Tabriz.

Safavid sources explicitly state that during these raids, the region was devastated, and a large portion of the local population fell victim to plunder, confirming the extremely harsh nature of this campaign.

Renowned Georgian nobles Vakhus Guji and his ally, the ruler of the territories held by Keikhosrow, Sharmazanoghlu, were captured and executed, and their lands were divided.

Writing about these events seventy years later and having the opportunity to evaluate them retrospectively, Iskender Bey Munshi considered the division of the Georgian kingdoms between the Ottomans and Safavids as part of the Treaty of Amasya.

According to him, both sides agreed that Samtskhe, Kartli, and Kakheti would remain under Safavid jurisdiction, while the Ottomans would control Basiani, Dadian, and Kuriyana (Imretia, Mingrelia, and Guria).

In response to the threat posed by the Ottomans, Shah Tahmasp, reinforced by his trusted commander Shahverdi Sultan Ziyadoghlu Qajar, invaded Luarsab's territory.

In February, the Shah and his army moved southward to Ganja, where the governor, Shahverdi Sultan Ziyadoghlu Qajar, hosted feasts and festivities in honor of the successful campaign for eight days.

The consequences of this event were recorded in one of Kartli's palace chronicles as follows:[25] Upon hearing the news of his son's death, Levan's heart was engulfed in flames of sorrow, and tears of blood streamed from his eyes.

Additionally, the rugged terrain of Georgia, characterized by dense forests and mountains, hindered the eradication of resistance centers in the region.