Tank destroyer battalion (United States)

The conference gave broad support to the idea of creating mobile anti-tank defensive units (commanded by corps or army formations) which could be deployed to meet an armored attack.

The effort stalled on the issue of which branch of the Army should control it—the infantry (as a defensive role), the cavalry (as a mobile response force), or the artillery (as heavy guns).

Their employment was judged a success—though not without some disgruntled voices in the Armored Branch arguing that the umpires had rigged the results[2] — and on 27 November, Marshall ordered the establishment of a tank destroyer Tactical and Firing Center at Fort Hood, Texas, under Bruce, and the activation of 53 new anti-tank battalions under the command of General Headquarters.

Tank destroyer units were expected to be employed as complete battalions, held in reserve and committed at critical points, rather than parceled out as small defensive strongpoints.

Their role was to slow down, or even stop, a Blitzkrieg style armored thrust and prevent it from penetrating too deeply or from encircling friendly forces in a pincer movement.

Mobile tank destroyers were also allowed to support infantry operations, or even function in an indirect fire role, so long as their main mission was not compromised.

[citation needed] In terms of vehicle design, mobile tank destroyers were to be heavily armed, but with speed given priority over armor protection.

[9] However, combat experience in Normandy and in Italy – coupled with the fact that purpose-built M18 Hellcat and M36 tank destroyers were becoming available – showed that the towed units were underperforming compared with self-propelled ones.

[g] This engagement had the distinction of being the only time a battalion would fight in the way envisaged by the original "tank destroyer" concept, as an organized independent unit opposing an armored force in open terrain.

Critical analysis of the new force was mixed; while the 601st had successfully repulsed the attack, it had lost two-thirds of its strength in the process, contributing to Major General George Patton's declaration that the concept was "unsuccessful in the conditions of the theater".

[15] McNair responded by further clarifying the role of the tank destroyer—it was to be a highly mobile force, which sought to find and occupy favorable positions to engage an oncoming enemy attack.

This quickly gained popularity—heavily supported by McNair—and in November 1943 it was ordered that half of all tank destroyer battalions were to be equipped with towed guns; this was a major distortion of Bradley's suggestion.

While the formal doctrine still called for the employment of complete battalions, the Tank Destroyer Center began to emphasize a new focus on combined arms training and small-unit actions.

New field manuals were prepared to discuss the independent operation of tank-destroyer platoons, and crews began to have specialized training in their secondary roles, such as indirect gunnery or anti-fortification work.

—Executive Officer, 15th Infantry Regiment[19]The second theater of operations for tank destroyer units was the Italian campaign, beginning with the landings in Sicily in July 1943, and continuing into mainland Italy that September.

The M18 was first deployed in the summer of 1944, and was not seen as a great success in the Italian theater; its high speed was only of limited use in the restricted terrain, and as a result it was effectively a slightly up-gunned M10.

The vehicular weapon could follow the advance of infantry or armor, or become a part of the forward elements of the assault, all well beyond the capability of the towed gun.. By far the largest employment of tank destroyer units was in the north-western Europe campaign through France, the Low Countries and Germany.

This lack of mobility was aggravated by the cold wet weather, and the rough conditions, which tended to bog down wheeled vehicles and immobilize fixed guns.

One battalion, the 801st, lost 17 towed guns in just two days, while the M10-equipped 644th, which fought alongside it, found ideal opportunities for close-range ambushes and claimed 17 tanks in the same time period.

Despite US forces being subjected to a major armored thrust by the Germans in the Ardennes, Tank Destroyer units were not ordered to engage the enemy according to stated doctrine.

Because of the shortness of the interior lines within the besieged Bastogne, Tank Destroyer units could be directed very quickly to any location in response to a German attack and prevented any breakthrough.

While the tank destroyers were broadly used in their intended role in the Ardennes—being used as a reserve to counter a massed armored attack – there were two significant differences between their use and the original doctrine.

As such, the tank destroyer battalions spent the closing months of the war as mobile support units, broadly distributed into secondary roles.

A small number of tank destroyer battalions served in the South-West Pacific; due to the lack of Japanese armor, these were employed almost entirely in the infantry support role, effectively acting as highly mobile artillery.

While tank destroyers had proven their versatility and efficiency in combat, especially in secondary roles, their long-term utility was becoming doubtful by 1945 in light of changes to Army doctrine.

The M26 was redesignated as a medium tank shortly after the end of the war, becoming the standard vehicle of armored units, and further reducing the need for any specialist anti-tank capacity.

The result of this experience led military strategists to conclude that neither static anti-tank positions at the front line, nor mobile battalion-sized tank destroyer units operating in the rear, were the best solution to enemy armored thrusts.

Seen especially in the Battle of Kursk, large numbers of Soviet infantry and armor were arranged in various deep echelons to blunt German advances and prevent breakthroughs.

In addition, the Army was reducing its size very rapidly after the end of hostilities; the tank destroyer branch cost the equivalent of three or four full divisions, a definite luxury for a non-essential service.

The deficiencies of the M3 GMC were quickly noted in the 1941 maneuver, and the experience gained allowed a "perfect" advanced tank destroyer to be planned, one which would give a high priority to speed.