The town of St. Vith, a vital road junction, was close to the boundary between the 5th and Sepp Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army, the two strongest units of the attack.

[4]: 20 In the months following the initial pronouncement, Hitler gathered reserves for his plan in great secrecy, realizing such a counterattack would have no success unless it was a complete surprise.

His chosen commander for the Western Front and figurehead behind which new armies would rally was Gerd von Rundstedt, an aged field marshal of great reputation and respectability.

The 6th SS Panzer Army would be the strong right arm of the offensive, on the northern flank and was tasked with driving through Elsenborn Ridge along the Albert Canal on the most direct route to Antwerp.

Manteuffel had a reputation for meticulous planning and daring execution, along with a flair for independent thinking that had led to trouble in the past with his superiors.

[4]: 101–2, 644–8 After being informed of the nature of the offensive in a meeting with Hitler, von Rundstedt and Model on 27 October 1944, Manteuffel proceeded to place his personal imprint on the grand plan.

[4]: 35–6 While detailing the deployment of his forces along the Westwall opposite the American lines, Manteuffel performed an extensive reconnaissance of the positions on the German 5th Panzer army front.

[4]: 101–2 In planning for the actual attack, Manteuffel had divided his 5th Panzer Army into three corps composed of infantry, tanks, and supporting artillery.

This northernmost, or right wing, element would flank and begin an envelopment of the American forces occupying fortifications on the Schnee Eifel and then converge on the town of Winterspelt.

General der Artillerie Walter Lucht, commander of LXVI Corps, regarded the 18th Volksgrenadier as the more reliable of the two, due to its familiarity with the local terrain, and its German composition.

This system of attack relied on special shock companies of 80 men that would utilize the rough terrain of the Ardennes to bypass strongpoints and seize key bridges, crossroads, and high ground.

Manteuffel also set up a special mechanized combat engineer battalion using halftracks and self-propelled assault guns to clear road blocks and allow for fast flanking attacks.

In order to advance into Germany, the American high command realized it would have to control the dams that regulated water flow in the Roer River.

The 106th Division came out worse in this deal, for the 2nd had picked up extra communications gear, weapons, and vehicles in the course of its travels across Europe for which the 106th had no equivalent, so the 2nd took most of their equipment with them.

The 106th had also suffered significant personnel changes, since sixty percent of its troop strength had been used to make up for higher than expected losses in units already in Europe.

This had the effect of breaking the defense into isolated positions, and denying corps and army commands information on events at the front line.

The only significant check in the German advance was at Kobscheid, where the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had circled the village with barbed wire and dug in machine guns from their armored cars.

The Squadron was directed by Colonel Devine to take-up positions on a new defense line along the ridge running from Manderfeld to Andler, on the north side of the Our River.

Colonel Friedrich Kittel of the 62nd Division had set up a bicycle battalion to make a fast run on St. Vith from Eigelscheid, but the snow, ice, and mud had made it ineffective.

This order, and the slow German southern arm, gave more Americans a chance to escape, but since they had newly arrived in the area, and had few compasses or maps, most were unable to take advantage of the opportunity.

The German activity during the counter offensive seemed to follow this pattern, and since communication with the division headquarters in St. Vith was unreliable and intermittent, the Americans had remained for the most part inert.

It was only at 02:15 on 18 December that they received an order from Jones to break out to the west along the Bleialf - Schoenberg – St. Vith road, clearing the area of Germans in the process.

By nightfall both regiments had covered 3 miles (4.8 km) to the base of the ridge forming the east side of the Our River valley, and were prepared to attack and capture the bridge at Schoenberg at 10:00 the next day.

By midnight of the 17th, he had managed to set up the beginnings of what was called the “horseshoe defense” of St. Vith, a line of units to the north, east and south of town.

Meeting Manteuffel in the confusion, Model ordered him to capture St. Vith on the 18th, giving him control of the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade to make sure the objective would be met.

The mechanized combat engineer battalion of the 18th Volksgrenadiers, with a group from the 1st SS Panzer, did attack from the north, but were repelled by counterattacks from the 7th and 9th Armored.

Montgomery had seen the threat of a larger encirclement of American forces, and hoped to gather a reserve west of the Meuse to finally block the German advance while also eliminating vulnerable salients in the allied lines.

They had brought up many objections to securing the area: poor roads, unreliable communications and supply, severe combat losses, as well as the imminent danger of being cut off by rapidly moving panzer divisions.

A cold wind from the northeast, and clear weather, froze the ground, allowing the free movement of tracked vehicles and the use of allied air superiority.

American forces were able to escape to the southwest, cross country to Crombach, Beho, Bovigny and Vielsalm west of the Salm River.