Said Mitscher: "The ideal composition of a fast-carrier task force is four carriers, six to eight support vessels and not less than 18 destroyers, preferably 24.

The supporting ships sailed relatively close by, and added their anti-aircraft fire to that of the carriers to help ward off attacking aircraft.

This allowed the Navy to perform at a higher operational tempo, while giving the Japanese the general impression of naval assets greater than what were actually available.

[10] The original TF 38 came into existence in August 1943, built around USS Saratoga, and under the command of Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman.

The only time that any aircraft carriers were used to support operations in New Guinea in the Southwest Pacific theater was during the double landings at Hollandia and Aitape in April 1944, hundreds of miles behind Japanese enemy lines and far beyond the range of short-ranged P-40 fighters of the Allied Air Forces.

TF 58 only stayed for four days but contributed much crucial air support to one of the greatest successes in the Pacific War.

[15] Following the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Mitscher went on shore leave and planning duty, and Vice Admiral McCain took over as commanding officer of TF 38, which continued under Halsey and the Third Fleet.

In January 1945 TF 38 raided the South China Sea and attacked Japanese positions in Formosa and Luzon.

On 26 January 1945, Halsey and McCain went on shore leave and planning duty, while Spruance and Mitscher returned to their previous commands.

They led the fleet through the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, facing sustained attacks from land-based Japanese kamikaze aircraft.

After two months operating off the coast of Okinawa in support of Army forces engaged in battle on the island, the command staff was exhausted from the continuous pressure of fending off kamikaze attacks.

On his return to Pearl Harbor, he notified Halsey that he would have to take over command from Spruance in thirty days, whether or not the mission was completed.

[16] Nimitz' assessment of the exhaustion and psychological toll on Spruance and Mitscher and their staff due to the kamikazes proved to be justified.