Aside from a limited number of HEAT shells for the unit's 105 mm howitzers, crew-served weapons that could defeat T-34/85 tanks from the Soviet Union had not yet been distributed to the US Army forces in South Korea.

North Korean troops eventually flanked and overwhelmed the US positions, and the rest of the task force retreated in disorder.

During the night of June 25, 1950, ten divisions of the North Korean People's Army launched a full-scale invasion of its southern neighbor, the Republic of Korea.

The smaller South Korean Army suffered from widespread lack of organization and equipment and was unprepared for war.

He decided to send the 1st Battalion from the formation because its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Bradford Smith, was the most experienced leading man since he had fought at the Battle of Guadalcanal during World War II.

The battalion deployed quickly to block advancing North Korean forces and performed a holding action while the rest of the division could be moved to South Korea by sea.

Good luck, and God bless you and your men!The first units of the 24th Infantry Division left Itazuke Air Base in Japan on June 30.

[12][22] The 24th Division commander, William F. Dean, personally ordered Smith to stop the North Korean force along the highway from Suwon and "as far from Pusan" as possible.

[25] Heavy rain made air support impossible and so Smith and Perry preregistered the artillery battery in the hope it would be just as effective.

[7] The tanks, which were around 2 km (1.2 mi) from the infantry force, were hit with numerous 105 mm howitzer rounds, but they were unaffected.

[1][11] Once the tanks reached the infantry line Second Lieutenant Ollie Connor fired 22 2.36-inch rockets at a range of 15 yd (14 m) from his M9A1 launcher tube.

[30] The tracks of the T-34 tanks cut the communication signal wires between the infantry and artillery forces, which further compounded the confusion.

Perry was wounded in the leg by North Korean small arms fire as he attempted to get the crew of the disabled tank to surrender.

[32] Although Smith later stated that he believed that the rounds had deteriorated with age, the ineffectiveness of the 2.36-inch bazooka had been demonstrated repeatedly during World War II against German armor.

[33] Because of peacetime defense cutbacks, the 24th Infantry Division had never received improved M20 3.5-inch "Super Bazookas" with M28A2 HEAT antitank ammunition, which could defeat Soviet tanks.

[32] The column apparently was not in communication with the tanks that had preceded it, and the North Korean infantry was not aware of the Americans' presence.

[31] At 11:45, when the column had advanced to within 1,000 yd (910 m) of the Americans, Smith gave the order for the task force to open fire with everything that it had.

Behind them, around 1,000 of the infantry formed in the rice paddies to the east of the road in an attempt to flank the American forces, but they were repulsed.

[38][39] One North Korean officer later told the historian John Toland that the American forces at the battle seemed "too frightened to fight.

Task Force Smith suffered its highest casualties during the withdrawal since its soldiers were the most exposed to enemy fire.

[1] The vehicles, unmolested by the North Korean forces, departed for Pyongtaek and Cheonan, picking up stragglers along the way and eventually joined units of the 24th Infantry Division that had established a second line of defense.

The last stragglers from 2nd Platoon, B Company, reached Chonan five days later, only 30 minutes ahead of the North Korean Army.

[1] The US troops advancing northward during the Pusan breakout offensive would later discover a series of shallow graves containing the bodies of several soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division.

[43] The fight showed that American forces were weak and unprepared for the war, and outdated equipment was insufficient to fight North Korean armor and poorly trained and inexperienced units were no match for better-trained North Korean troops,[1] but the disparity in number of troops engaged certainly had a profound effect on the outcome of that battle and others.

[37] Smith also said he felt he had stayed too long in his position, which allowed North Korean troops to envelop the force and cause heavy casualties as it retreated.

[46] Over the next month the 24th Infantry Division would fight in numerous engagements to delay North Korean forces with similar results.

[48] In the years after the Korean War, the US Army used the areas in Japan that Task Force Smith had trained as a memorial.