His 1999 article with Michel Balinski analyzes the connection between David Gale and Lloyd Shapley's college admissions model and priority based resource allocation problems.
[7] A subsequent paper with Atila Abdulkadiroglu defines the school choice problem and documents how many U.S. cities are using assignment mechanisms with undesirable properties.
[10] Working together with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak and Alvin E. Roth, the team of economists identified parents in Boston who developed heuristics on how to play this real-world game so that their children would not be unassigned, leaving those unaware of these features disadvantaged.
In 2007, through an act of Parliament, British authorities outlawed the use of First Preference First arrangements, which made Boston's old method of school assignment illegal throughout 150 English districts.
Hospitals and professionals in the transplant community initially felt that the practical burden of allowing three pairwise exchanges would be too large.
[16] Before that, paired kidney exchanges were conducted a handful of times in the US and new national programs were starting to pop up in South Korea and the Netherlands.
[19] Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver partnered with Dr. Michael Rees to support Alliance for Paired Donation in 2005, which adopted their mechanisms and software.