"[3] In response to disenfranchisement, five serving prisoners including career criminal Arthur Taylor "sought a formal declaration from this Court that the prohibition is inconsistent with s 12(a) of the Bill of Rights".

[5] Prior to the review proceeding to a substantive hearing the Attorney-General had tried unsuccessfully to have the challenge struck out on the grounds courts had no jurisdiction over this matter and that any relief given "would breach the fundament principle of comity applying to the relationship between the judiciary and Parliament".

[7] Reasons given by the Attorney-General in his report included that "The objective of the Bill is not rationally linked to the blanket ban on prisoner voting.

[10] In coming to his conclusion Justice Heath noted, The inconsistency arises in the context of the most fundamental aspect of a democracy; namely, the right of all citizens to elect those who will govern on their behalf.

Enactment of a statutory provision that is inconsistent with that fundamental right should be marked by a formal declaration of the High Court, rather than by an observation buried in its reasons for judgment.

[21] He contended that the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908[22] had sufficiently covered the area, and that this effectively ruled out such a remedy at common law.

[25] The Attorney-General accepted that sections 2–6 of the Bill allow the courts to identify inconsistencies between protected rights and other statutes, but said that this is limited to simply making indications of incompatibility, not formal declarations.

[33] In Quilter v Attorney-General, the Court held that the Marriage Act 1955 was an unjustified limitation on the right to freedom from discrimination of same sex couples.

In Taylor v Attorney-General, Heath J stated that it would be difficult to comprehend that Parliament would confer this declaratory power on the Tribunal but not on a more senior court.

In coming to his decision, Heath J had examined the section 7 report before reaching the same conclusion, and the Speaker was concerned that he had effectively reviewed a parliamentary proceeding in doing so.

[49] However the Court of Appeal held that Heath J had not done so; he had merely described the parliamentary processes and noted the report's existence before coming to his own conclusion about the same subject matter.

[54] This was the first time a court in New Zealand had recognised that a formal declaration of inconsistency is an available remedy for statutory breaches of the Bill of Rights.

[57] The other significant outcome of the decision that declarations of inconsistency are within the jurisdiction of the courts is that it acts as a powerful check on parliamentary sovereignty.

[59] It affirms the courts as “upholders of rights, standing between ordinary citizens and the might of Parliament.”[60] The extent of the significance of this case will depend on whether Parliament remedies the Act in question.

[62] Taylor merely expresses that the courts have a “reasonable expectation that other branches of government, respecting the judicial function, will respond by reappraising the legislation and making any changes that are thought appropriate.”[63] If Parliament chooses to enact a rights-consistent version of the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act then Taylor could mark the beginning of a major constitutional development in New Zealand.