The Administrative State

The argument for the power is that all federal agencies/ officials are subject to the President of the United States, who is elected accommodating the new power democratically so that it does not need to be voted on directly by the public; where the counter is that “agencies remain inefficient, ineffective, and undemocratic;” attempting to justify that the public’s inability to vote for the policy that the agency adopts is undemocratic/unconstitutional (Harvard Law Review).

[2] Harvard Law Review notes “The presidential control model of the administrative state, perhaps most definitively expounded by now-Justice Elena Kagan, suggests that top-down accountability affords agencies a measure of democratic accountability and assures effective administration,"[3] i.e. that agency-implemented policy/law is subject to democracy by way of citizens' ability to hold the elected official at the head of the relevant chain of government responsible.

They question whether top-down responsibility and accountability are efficient enough to prevent government agencies' natural hunger for power from overriding their mandate to act in the best interests of the people.

The book posits that an "administrative state" contains a tension between democracy and bureaucracy that obliges career public servants to protect democratic principles.

In addition, he states that with the evolution of social trends in the U.S., fundamental laws were eroded by modern ideas thus changing the entire concept of government and public administration.