Regarding the landmass of Eurasia as the center of global power, Brzezinski sets out to formulate a Eurasian geostrategy for the United States.

Much of Brzezinski's analysis is concerned with geostrategy in Central Asia, focusing on the exercise of power on the Eurasian landmass in a post-Soviet environment.

He asserts that the current global dominance of the United States depends on how effectively it manages the complex power dynamics of the Eurasian continent.

A stable continental balance, with the United States acting as a political arbiter, should enable the gradual achievement of overarching goals.

"The ultimate objective of American policy should be benign and visionary: to shape a truly cooperative global community, in keeping with long-range trends and with the fundamental interests of humankind.

Genscher sees Brzezinski's strategy as an attempt to create new structures of world politics through dialogue and rapprochement (with China and Russia), which is not possible without the participation of the United States in cooperation with a strengthened Europe.

The former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wrote in his review of October 31, 1997 in the Zeit that the title alone made "a highly provocative American self-confidence" abundantly clear.

Despite many correct partial analyses, Brzezinski's book neglects the economic dynamics of important states as well as future population growth and the conflicts that will become inevitable as a result.

"[4] Volker Rühe described the book in his review for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on November 26, 1997, as a "bold and probably also provocative, at the same time excellent and valuable contribution" to a new "thinking in the categories of dialogue and exchange, regional and global cooperation, networking of business and politics".

Brzezinski wants to preserve the position of power of the United States in order to let it merge into institutionalized, worldwide cooperation in the long term.

[6] Sabine Feiner, lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Regensburg, sees in her thesis (2000) Brzeznski's geostrategy in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Halford Mackinder ("Heartland theory") and Nicholas J. Spykman ("Rimland").

"[9] In 2008, the publicist Hauke Ritz argued that Brzezinski's premises of geopolitical analysis in The Grand Chessboard were wrong, despite their intrinsic logic and high persuasiveness.

Chris Luenen, Head of the Geopolitical Program[11] at the Global Policy Institute in London,[12] advocated in a guest article in the Zeit (from 2014) Europeans should depart from the strategy of the USA, which is oriented towards Brzezinski's The Grand Chessboard.

"[13]David C. Hendrickson, in his article in Foreign Affairs on November 1, 1997, saw the core of the book as the ambitious strategy of NATO to move eastward to Ukraine's Russian border and vigorously support the newly independent republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which is an integral part of what Hendrickson said could be called a "tough love" strategy for the Russians.

Hendrickson considers "this great project" to be problematic for two reasons: the "excessive expansion of Western institutions" could well introduce centrifugal forces into it; moreover, Brzezinski's "test of what legitimate Russian interests are" seems to be so strict that even a democratic Russia would probably "fail".