[2] Out of the varied models of game theory, Riker asserts that those involving the number of players are the most in understanding society [incomplete: the most ___ ?].
[4] Riker points to two main concepts devised by John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern as being an important limit on the potential coalitions in a n-person game.
"In n-person, zero sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur.
"[7] Riker builds on this to form a descriptive statement, or sociological law as he puts it, about the natural world which embodies his size principle.
He states this as, "in social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side-payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger.
"[8] More general criticism of Riker's size principle has been based on the vagueness of its predictive ability, especially when information is not perfect.
Eric Browne, in his article, "Testing Theories of Coalition Formation in the European Context," argues this point.
"[10] Other criticisms of the size principle have been directed at the validity of its proof[11] and the assumption "that politicians are primarily driven by the intrinsic benefits of office and that they will coalesce with any party out of expediency.