Manstein benefited greatly from the massive air support of Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen's Luftflotte 4, whose 1,214 aircraft flew over 1,000 sorties per day from 20 February to 15 March to support the German ground troops, a level of airpower equal to that during the Case Blue strategic offensive a year earlier.

The house-to-house fighting in Kharkov was also particularly bloody for the German SS Panzer Corps, which had suffered approximately 4,300 men killed and wounded by the time operations ended in mid-March.

[7] Throughout 1942 German casualties totaled around 1.9 million personnel,[10] and by the start of 1943 the Wehrmacht was around 470,000 men below full strength on the Eastern Front.

[14] On 2 February, the Red Army launched Operation Star, threatening the cities of Belgorod, Kharkov and Kursk.

[16] On 15 February, two fresh Soviet tank corps threatened the city of Zaporizhia on the Dnieper River, which controlled the last major road to Rostov and housed the headquarters of Army Group South and Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet Four).

Manstein informed him that an immediate counterattack on Kharkov would be fruitless, but that he could successfully attack the overextended Soviet flank with his five Panzer corps, and recapture the city later.

By this time Stavka believed it could decide the war in the southwest Russian SFSR and eastern Ukrainian SSR, expecting total victory.

[29] Unexpected German resistance began to slow the operation considerably,[28] offering Rokossovsky only limited gains on the left flank of his attack and in the center.

[34] As a result of Soviet over-extension and the casualties they had taken during their offensive, at the beginning of Manstein's counterattack the Germans could achieve a tactical superiority in numbers, including the number of tanks present – for example, Manstein's 350 tanks outnumbered Soviet armor almost seven to one at the point of contact, and were far better supplied with fuel.

[37] The German Wehrmacht was understrength, especially after continuous operations between June 1942 and February 1943, to the point where Hitler appointed a committee made up of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Martin Bormann and Hans Lammers, to recruit 800,000 new able-bodied men – half of whom would come from "nonessential industries".

Simultaneously, Army Detachment Hollidt was ordered to contain the continuing Soviet efforts to break through German lines.

[57] The 1st Panzer Army was ordered to drive north in an attempt to cut off and destroy Popov's Mobile Group, using accurate intelligence on Soviet strength which allowed the Wehrmacht to pick and choose their engagements and bring about tactical numerical superiority.

[59] First Panzer Army was able to surround and pocket Popov's Mobile Group by 24 February, although a sizable contingent of Soviet troops managed to escape north.

[66] The 3rd Tank Army was harassed and severely damaged by continuous German aerial attacks with Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers.

[69] By 5 March, the attacking 3rd Tank Army had been badly mauled, with only a small number of men able to escape northwards, and was forced to erect a new defensive line.

Taking advantage of uncoordinated and piecemeal Soviet attempts to plug this gap, Manstein ordered a continuation of the offensive towards Kharkov.

A British government analysis in 1948 praised Richthofen's skill during the Third Battle of Kharkov, singling out his constant use of the principles of "extreme flexibility, coordination and concentration".

Only with aerial and artillery support provided by Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers and StuG assault guns were the German infantry able to battle their way into the city.

[78] Simultaneously, the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, with armor attached from a separate unit, attacked down the main road from Belgorod, fighting an immediate counterattack produced over the Kharkov's airport, coming on their left flank.

From the northeast, another contingent of German infantry, armor and self-propelled guns attempted to take control of the road exits to the cities of Rogan and Chuhuiv.

At around 15:00, Hoth ordered Hausser to immediately disengage with SS Das Reich, and instead redeploy to cut off escaping Soviet troops.

A third attempt by Hoth was obeyed, and Das Reich disengaged, using a corridor opened by LSSAH to cross northern Kharkov and redeploy east of the city.

[81] The 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiment's 2nd Battalion was able to surround the square, after taking heavy casualties from Soviet snipers and other defenders, by evening.

Meanwhile, the division's left wing reached the junction of the Volchansk and Chuhuiv exit roads and went on the defensive, fighting off a number of Soviet counterattacks.

At the same time, Peiper's forces were able to breakout south, suffering from bitter fighting against a tenacious Soviet defense, and link up with the division's left wing at the Volchansk and Chuhuiv road junction.

[note 2][87] Between April and July 1943, the Red Army took its time to rebuild its forces in the area and prepare for an eventual renewal of the German offensive, known as the Battle of Kursk.

By 17 March, it is estimated that the SS Panzer Corps had lost around 44% of its fighting strength, including around 160 officers and about 4,300 enlisted personnel.

[90] After the fall of Kharkov, the Soviet defense of the Donets had collapsed,[91] allowing Manstein's forces to drive to Belgorod on 17 March,[92] and take it by the next day.

The first, known as the "backhand method" was to wait for the inevitable renewal of the Soviet offensive and conduct another operation similar to that of Kharkov – allowing the Red Army to take ground, extend itself and then counterattack and surround it.

The second, or the "forehand method", encompassed a major German offensive by Army Groups South and Center[96] against the protruding Kursk salient.