It had a rear-mounted engine and used nine steel-tired, eighty-centimetre-diameter overlapping road wheels per side with internal springing, mounted on transverse torsion bars, in a similar manner to the original Henschel-designed Tiger I.

To simplify maintenance, however, the wheels were only overlapping without being interleaved—the full Schachtellaufwerk rubber-rimmed road-wheel system that had been in use on nearly all German half-tracks used the interleaved design, later inherited by the Tiger I[17] and Panther.

One Porsche version had a gasoline-electric drive (fundamentally identical to a Diesel-electric transmission, only using a gasoline-fueled engine as the prime mover), similar to a gasoline-electric hybrid but without a storage battery; two separate drivetrains in parallel, one per side of the tank, each consisting of a hybrid drive train; gasoline engine–electric generator–electric motor–drive sprocket.

[22] Powered turret traverse was provided by the variable speed Boehringer-Sturm L4S hydraulic motor, which was driven from the main engine by a secondary drive shaft.

US M4 Sherman or Soviet T-34 medium tanks) this allowed for fine laying of the gun without the gunner needing to use his traverse handwheel.

Overlapped 800 mm (31 in) diameter road wheels with rubber cushions and steel tyres rode inside the tracks.

Other suggested improvements included stabilised sights, a stabilised main gun, an automatic ammunition feed, a Carl Zeiss AG stereoscopic rangefinder, heated crew compartment, stowage for an additional 12 rounds, and an overpressure and air filtration system to protect against poison gas.

[32] Apart from research, training, and a five-tank attachment to the Panzer Lehr, the Tiger II was only issued to heavy tank battalions (schwere Panzer-Abteilungen) of the German Army (Heer), or Waffen-SS.

The inspector general of panzer troops, Wolfgang Thomale, said in a briefing on November 4, 1944, "These complaints could be traced back to the new track, which, although a considerable production simplification, on the other hand entails a greater susceptibility of the Tiger."

[40] Henschel's chief designer, Erwin Aders, wrote, "The failure occurred because the Tiger II went into production without considering the test results.

[36] The Schwere Heeres Panzer Abteilung 501 arrived on the Eastern Front with only eight out of 45 tanks operational; these faults were mostly due to final drive failures.

The first five Tiger IIs delivered to the Panzer Lehr Division broke down before they could be used in combat, and were destroyed to prevent capture.

[42] Henschel worked closely with crews to solve the problems, and with the introduction of modified seals, gaskets, drive train components and a new track and sprocket wheel design, as well as improved driver training and sufficient maintenance, the Tiger II could be maintained in a satisfactory operational condition.

The extremely tough and steadfast enemy (penal battalions) was shaken to the core by the energetic assault and his communications to the rear thrown into total confusion by the destruction of various columns and a transport train which, in the final analysis, forced the Russian Sixth Army from the Debrecen area.

When the formation is used as a single, unified entity and is employed in accordance with proper tactics, it always brings decisive success... [45] Notwithstanding its initial reliability problems, the Tiger II was remarkably agile for such a heavy vehicle.

Two were lost in combat, while the company commander's tank became irrecoverably trapped after falling into a bomb crater created during Operation Goodwood.

[49] Because these German tanks suffered ammunition explosions, which caused many crew fatalities, main gun rounds were no longer allowed to be stowed within the turret, reducing capacity to 68.

[50] Up to fourteen Tiger IIs of the 501st were destroyed or captured in the area between 11 and 14 August to ambushes and flank attacks by both Soviet T-34-85 and IS-2 tanks, and ISU-122 assault guns in inconvenient sandy terrain.

The capture of three operational Tiger IIs allowed the Soviets to conduct tests at Kubinka and to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses[51] On 15 October 1944, Tiger IIs of 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion played a crucial role during Operation Panzerfaust, supporting Otto Skorzeny's troops in taking the Hungarian capital of Budapest, which ensured that the country remained with the Axis until the end of the war.

The 503rd remained in the Hungarian theater of operations for 166 days, during which time it accounted for at least 121 Soviet tanks, 244 anti-tank guns and artillery pieces, five aircraft and a train.

This was set against the loss of 25 Tiger IIs; ten were knocked out by Soviet troops and burned out, two were sent back to Vienna for a factory overhaul, while thirteen were blown up by their crews for various reasons, usually to prevent them from falling into enemy hands.

[citation needed] The Tiger II was also used in significant numbers, distributed into four heavy panzer battalions, during the Ardennes Offensive (also known as the 'Battle of the Bulge') of December 1944.

503) claimed approximately 500 kills in the period from January to April 1945 on the Eastern Front for the loss of 45 Tiger IIs (most of which were abandoned and destroyed by their own crews after mechanical breakdowns or for lack of fuel).

[58] The heavy armour and powerful long-range gun gave the Tiger II an advantage against all opposing Western Allied and Soviet tanks attempting to engage it from head on.

A Wa Prüf 1 report estimated that the Tiger II's frontal aspect was impervious to the Soviet 122 mm D-25T, one of the largest calibre tank guns of the war.

document of February 1945 estimated that the British (76.2 mm) QF 17-pounder gun, using armour-piercing discarding sabot shot was theoretically capable of penetrating the front of the Tiger II's turret and nose (lower front hull) at 1,100 and 1,200 yd (1,000 and 1,100 m) respectively although, given the lack of a stated angle, this was presumably at the ideal 90 degrees and in combat the Tiger II was never penetrated frontally by the QF 17-Pounder.

It proved capable of passing completely through its "colleague", a Tiger Ausf B's turret at a range of 400 m. The armour of one vehicle was tested by firing at it with shells between 100 and 152 mm calibre.

As a result, even when shells did not penetrate the armour, there was often a large amount of spalling from the inside of the plates, which damaged the transmission and rendered the tank inoperable.

Further testing showed that the armour plate was inferior quality to earlier German tanks such as the Tiger I and Panther.

Lab testing found the plates lacked molybdenum (ascribed to a loss of supply, being replaced by vanadium), resulting in low malleability.