This led to a series of revolts by powerful regional nobles, both Catholic and Protestant, who resented attempts to reduce their authority, while religious tensions were heightened by the outbreak in 1618 of the Thirty Years War.

Unlike many of his colleagues, he primarily opposed the Huguenots because their autonomy threatened the strong, centralised state needed to defeat Spain, rather than because of their religion; he later proved equally ruthless in attacking their Catholic counterparts.

[5] For different reasons, both England and France were concerned by Spanish advances in the Netherlands; in the Anglo-Dutch defensive alliance of 5 June 1624, James I agreed to provide 6,000 troops for two years.

The Dutch gave France the right to purchase warships, agreed to contribute twenty for a joint attack on the Republic of Genoa, provide protection against pirates based in the Barbary States, and favourable terms for transporting French goods.

In addition to the customs duties generated by imports, it was also among the biggest producers of salt, a major source of taxes for the state; its economic value and position made its capture crucial.

[11] Richelieu now activated the mutual defence provisions of both treaties; England was asked for seven warships, while the twenty Dutch vessels allocated for the attack on Genoa were now to be used against La Rochelle.

[13] The treaty of Compiègne thus allowed Richelieu to achieve his aim of neutralising Huguenot seapower and blockade La Rochelle; despite English attempts to relieve it, the city surrendered in October 1628, and the June 1629 Peace of Alès largely ended Protestant autonomy.